Section 4 — a grid finer than H/(m + 1) inherits the improvement
ProvedKelsoCrawford.ContinuousCore.fine_grid_improvesSuppose a finite market has regular utilities, (MP), (NFL), the reservation-salary relation, and continuous gross substitutes. Let be a gain that every individually rational allocation admits: some coalition can leave all its workers no worse off while increasing its firm’s profit by at least . If is the number of workers and
then every individually rational allocation paying salaries on the -grid admits a coalition that strictly improves every worker in that coalition and its firm using salaries on the same grid.
This is the discretization step that conflicts with the discrete core existence fact.
Formalization Note The denominator is a real number . The grid begins at each worker–firm reservation salary; no inverse utility function is used.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_KelsoCrawford_ContinuousCore_Model
namespace KelsoCrawford.ContinuousCore
theorem fine_grid_improves {W F : Type}
[Fintype W] [DecidableEq W] [Fintype F] [DecidableEq F] [Nonempty F]
(M : Market W F) (hu : M.UtilityRegular) (hMP : M.MP) (hNFL : M.NFL)
(hres : M.ReservationSalaries)
(hGS : ∀ j, KelsoCrawford.Process.GrossSubstitutesOn (M.y j) Set.univ)
(H : ℝ) (hH : 0 < H)
(hgain : ∀ A : Allocation W F, M.IsIR A →
∃ (j : F) (C : Finset W) (r : W → ℝ),
(∀ i ∈ C, M.u i (A.assign i) (A.sal i) ≤ M.u i j (r i)) ∧
KelsoCrawford.Process.profit (M.y j) (A.hired j) A.sal + H ≤ KelsoCrawford.Process.profit (M.y j) C r)
(δ : ℝ) (hδ : 0 < δ) (hδsmall : δ < H / ((Fintype.card W : ℝ) + 1))
(A : Allocation W F) (hIR : M.IsIR A)
(hgrid : ∀ i, A.sal i ∈ M.grid δ i (A.assign i)) :
M.CanStrictlyImprove (M.grid δ) A := by sorry
end KelsoCrawford.ContinuousCore
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.