Self-countering profiles are mixed Nash equilibria
ProvedNash1950.Countering.counters_self_iff_isMixedNashbest-responsegame-theorynash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
A profile counters itself exactly when it is a mixed Nash equilibrium:
Thus the fixed points of Nash's correspondence are precisely the equilibrium points described in the note.
Formalization Note. The right-hand side uses the published definition AGT.IsMixedNash; both sides require to be a tuple of lotteries.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_agt_games import Definitions.Def_Nash1950_Countering_Setting
Formal statement
namespace Nash1950.Countering
theorem counters_self_iff_isMixedNash {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
(S : ι → Type*) [∀ i, Fintype (S i)]
(u : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) :
∀ P : ∀ i, S i → ℝ, Counters u P P ↔ AGT.IsMixedNash u P := by sorry
end Nash1950.Countering
Source
Nash, Equilibrium points in n-person games, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 36 (1950), p. 49, ¶2, sentences 2–3 (PDF p. 3)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.