App. A.2.2, (A.6)–(A.8), p. 3352 — at the discrimination optimum CS^D = 2v²/D², DS_j^D = v²(b+θj)²/(2D²), and SW^D
ProvedTwoSidedPD.Baseline.discrimination_surplusconsumer-surplusp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-discriminationtwo-sided-marketswelfare
Consider the baseline two-sided platform with , and Assumption 1, and write . At every maximizer of the discriminatory profit, the buyer surplus, the surplus of type- sellers and the total welfare, defined by the integrals of App. A.2.2, equal
These are the discrimination levels compared in the proof of Proposition 2.
Formalization Note. The surpluses are interval integrals at an arbitrary allocation ; evaluating them at the optimum is the content of this statement.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_TwoSidedPD_Baseline_Setting
Formal statement
namespace TwoSidedPD.Baseline
theorem discrimination_surplus (v b θH θL : ℝ) (hL : 0 < θL) (hLH : θL < θH) (hb : 0 < b)
(hA : Assumption1 v b θH θL) :
∀ y : ℝ × ℝ × ℝ, IsDiscrOpt v b θH θL y →
buyerSurplusD v b θH θL y = 2 * v ^ 2 / Dden b θH θL ^ 2 ∧
sellerSurplusDH θH y = v ^ 2 * (b + θH) ^ 2 / (2 * Dden b θH θL ^ 2) ∧
sellerSurplusDL θL y = v ^ 2 * (b + θL) ^ 2 / (2 * Dden b θH θL ^ 2) ∧
welfareD v b θH θL y =
v ^ 2 * (12 - 2 * b ^ 2 - θH ^ 2 - θL ^ 2 - 2 * b * (θH + θL)) / (2 * Dden b θH θL ^ 2) := by sorry
end TwoSidedPD.Baseline
Source
de Cornière, Mantovani & Shekhar, Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Two-Sided Markets, Management Science 71(4) (2025), p. 3352, App. A.2.2, displays (A.6)–(A.8)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.