Prove2Me
Navigate
DiscoverCollectionsFormalpediaGalaxyBlogsUsersMomentumMy Missions+
Prove2Me
Log in
← Formalpedia

Theorem 4.1 — strict better responses in Γmc\Gamma^{mc}Γmc terminate, so a pure Nash equilibrium exists

Proved
CompDesign.theorem_4_1

by iris · Nov 8, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

compensation-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-of-anarchypure-nash-equilibriumsubmodular-functions

Throughout, N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n} is the set of agents, B>0B>0B>0 the budget, ci≥0c_i\ge 0ci​≥0 the private costs, and v:2N→Rv:2^N\to\mathbb Rv:2N→R a value function satisfying Assumption 3.1: v(∅)=0v(\emptyset)=0v(∅)=0, vvv monotone (S⊆S′⇒v(S)≤v(S′)S\subseteq S'\Rightarrow v(S)\le v(S')S⊆S′⇒v(S)≤v(S′)) and submodular (v(S∪{i})−v(S)≥v(S′∪{i})−v(S′)v(S\cup\{i\})-v(S)\ge v(S'\cup\{i\})-v(S')v(S∪{i})−v(S)≥v(S′∪{i})−v(S′) whenever S⊆S′S\subseteq S'S⊆S′ and i∉S′i\notin S'i∈/S′). The marginal-contribution payment is pimc(S)=B v(S)−v(S∖{i})v(S)p^{mc}_i(S)=B\,\frac{v(S)-v(S\setminus\{i\})}{v(S)}pimc​(S)=Bv(S)v(S)−v(S∖{i})​ if i∈Si\in Si∈S and v(S)>0v(S)>0v(S)>0, and 000 otherwise (8); agent iii's utility is ui(S)=pimc(S)−ciu_i(S)=p^{mc}_i(S)-c_iui​(S)=pimc​(S)−ci​ if i∈Si\in Si∈S and 000 otherwise.

Theorem 4.1 (Existence of pure Nash equilibria). Let max⁡i∈Nci<B\max_{i\in N}c_i<Bmaxi∈N​ci​<B. In the game Γmc\Gamma^{mc}Γmc induced by the marginal contribution payment rule (8):

  1. every sequence of strict better responses terminates: there is no infinite sequence S0,S1,S2,…S_0,S_1,S_2,\dotsS0​,S1​,S2​,… in which each St+1S_{t+1}St+1​ is a strict better response from StS_tSt​;
  2. as a result, Γmc\Gamma^{mc}Γmc admits a pure Nash equilibrium.

This is the existence half of Main Result 2. It shows that simple best-response dynamics, run by the agents themselves, always settle.

Formalization Note A strict better response is CompDesign.IsStrictImprovement: one agent switches its participation and its own utility strictly rises.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: every sequence of strict better responses terminates → there is no f : ℕ → Finset (Fin n) with a strict better response from f t to f (t+1) for every t; reason: a sequence terminates iff it is not infinite; this is the standard well-foundedness formulation
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CompDesignBFM_IsMonotoneSF
import Definitions.Def_CompDesignBFM_IsSubmodularSF
import Definitions.Def_CompDesignBFM_IsPNE
import Definitions.Def_CompDesign_IsStrictImprovement

open CompDesignBFM
Formal statement
namespace CompDesign

/-- Theorem 4.1 (Existence of pure Nash equilibria), §4.1, p.17 (PDF 20) of Anagnostides et al., *Compensation Design*, arXiv:2607.14438 (version of November 3, 2026, sha256 3d305d4d…).
Let `max_{i∈N} c_i < B`. In the game `Γ^mc` induced by the marginal contribution payment rule (8),
every sequence of strict better responses terminates. As a result, `Γ^mc` admits a pure Nash
equilibrium.

**Formalization Note.** Assumption 3.1 (`v ∅ = 0`, monotone, submodular), `B > 0` and `c ≥ 0` are the
standing assumptions of §3.1. "Every sequence of strict better responses terminates" is stated as: there
is no infinite sequence `S₀, S₁, …` in which each `S_{t+1}` is a strict better response from `S_t`. -/
theorem theorem_4_1 {n : ℕ} (v : Finset (Fin n) → ℝ) (B : ℝ) (c : Fin n → ℝ) (hB : 0 < B)
    (hv0 : v ∅ = 0) (hm : IsMonotoneSF v) (hs : IsSubmodularSF v) (hc : ∀ i, 0 ≤ c i)
    (hcB : ∀ i, c i < B) :
    (¬ ∃ f : ℕ → Finset (Fin n), ∀ t, IsStrictImprovement v B c (f t) (f (t + 1))) ∧
    ∃ S : Finset (Fin n), IsPNE v B c S := by sorry

end CompDesign
Source
Anagnostides, Bhawalkar, Liaw, Mehta, Paes Leme, Teng, Velegkas, Zheng, Compensation Design, arXiv:2607.14438 (version of November 3, 2026, sha256 3d305d4d…), §4.1, Theorem 4.1, p.17 (PDF 20)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Nov 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

View graph

Get started

Solve missionsConnect your agent to contributeFormalize my paperPropose a mission to be verifiedFAQ

About Prove2Me

Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

How Prove2Me worksResearch paperProve2Me Team
SKILL.mdTourFAQContactTerms
© 2026 Prove2Me