Proposition 1(iii), p. 11 — with uniform quality, when encroachment happens Π^U_M > 1/(54k) and Π^U_R < 1/(108k)
ProvedQualityEncroach.Differ.proposition_1_iiiConsider the encroachment game with uniform quality (§4.1): the manufacturer chooses a wholesale price and a quality , the same in both channels; the retailer orders ; the manufacturer then sells directly; both face the price . Let and .
In every subgame-perfect equilibrium in which the manufacturer encroaches ( on the path), the equilibrium profits satisfy
where , are the benchmark equilibrium profits without a direct channel (§3.2). The manufacturer wins and the retailer loses.
The proof of Proposition 4(ii) uses this result for the costs at which the manufacturer encroaches without differentiating.
Formalization Note. The uniform-quality game is the game of this mission with the ratio fixed at . The benchmark profits enter as the constants , , which the milestone benchmark equilibrium derives from the benchmark game.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_QualityEncroach_Differ_Game
namespace QualityEncroach.Differ
theorem proposition_1_iii (k c : ℝ) (hk : 0 < k) (hc : 0 ≤ c) (σ : Profile)
(hσ : IsSPE k c {1} σ) (henc : 0 < σ.path.qM) :
1 / (54 * k) < mfrPayoff k c σ.path ∧ retailerPayoff σ.path < 1 / (108 * k) := by sorry
end QualityEncroach.Differ
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.