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Proposition 6(a), p. 1350 — with σ_ε = 0, the QF contract with flexibility ψ and transfer price c̄(ψ) of (4) is system-efficient

Proved
TsayQF.EffQF.proposition_6a

by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

contractscoordinationp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1quantity-flexibilitysupply-chain

Let p>m>0p > m > 0p>m>0, u<mu < mu<m, s≥0s \ge 0s≥0 be the cost data, and let the demand signal μ\muμ have law ν\nuν, a probability measure on R\mathbb RR with finite variance whose distribution function F=ΘF = \ThetaF=Θ is differentiable and strictly increasing; with σε=0\sigma_\varepsilon = 0σε​=0 market demand equals μ\muμ. Let QCC∗>0Q^*_{CC} > 0QCC∗​>0 satisfy F(QCC∗)=(p+s−m)/(p+s−u)F(Q^*_{CC}) = (p+s-m)/(p+s-u)F(QCC∗​)=(p+s−m)/(p+s−u), i.e. QCC∗=F−1((p+s−m)/(p+s−u))Q^*_{CC} = F^{-1}((p+s-m)/(p+s-u))QCC∗​=F−1((p+s−m)/(p+s−u)). Take QF parameters 0≤ω<10\le\omega<10≤ω<1, α≥−ω\alpha\ge-\omegaα≥−ω, total flexibility ψ=(1+α)/(1−ω)\psi = (1+\alpha)/(1-\omega)ψ=(1+α)/(1−ω), and the transfer price

cˉ(ψ)=u+m−u1ψF ⁣(1ψF−1 ⁣(p+s−mp+s−u))+m−up+s−u.(4)\bar c(\psi) = u + \frac{m-u}{\dfrac1\psi F\!\left(\dfrac1\psi F^{-1}\!\left(\dfrac{p+s-m}{p+s-u}\right)\right) + \dfrac{m-u}{p+s-u}} . \tag{4}cˉ(ψ)=u+ψ1​F(ψ1​F−1(p+s−up+s−m​))+p+s−um−u​m−u​.(4)

Let q^=QCC∗/(1+α)\hat q = Q^*_{CC}/(1+\alpha)q^​=QCC∗​/(1+α). Under the QF contract {cˉ(ψ),(α,ω)}\{\bar c(\psi),(\alpha,\omega)\}{cˉ(ψ),(α,ω)}:

  1. a forecast q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 maximizes the retailer's expected profit q↦πR,QF(q,q(1+α))q\mapsto\pi_{R,QF}(q,q(1+\alpha))q↦πR,QF​(q,q(1+α)) over [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) if and only if q=q^q = \hat qq=q^​;
  2. given the forecast q^\hat qq^​, a production Q≥q^(1+α)Q \ge \hat q(1+\alpha)Q≥q^​(1+α) maximizes the EM's expected profit (2) over [q^(1+α),∞)[\hat q(1+\alpha),\infty)[q^​(1+α),∞) if and only if Q=q^(1+α)=QCC∗Q = \hat q(1+\alpha) = Q^*_{CC}Q=q^​(1+α)=QCC∗​;
  3. the resulting expected system profit is at least the central planner's expected profit at every production level:
ΠCC(Q)≤πR,QF(q^,q^(1+α))+πEM,QF(q^(1+α);q^)for all Q.\Pi_{CC}(Q) \le \pi_{R,QF}(\hat q,\hat q(1+\alpha)) + \pi_{EM,QF}(\hat q(1+\alpha);\hat q) \quad\text{for all } Q.ΠCC​(Q)≤πR,QF​(q^​,q^​(1+α))+πEM,QF​(q^​(1+α);q^​)for all Q.

Together, the equilibrium of the QF contract puts the efficient quantity QCC∗Q^*_{CC}QCC∗​ into the system and makes all of it available to the market, which is what the paper calls system efficiency. A menu of efficient contracts is obtained by varying ψ\psiψ and charging cˉ(ψ)\bar c(\psi)cˉ(ψ).

Formalization Note. F−1F^{-1}F−1 is not used as a function: QCC∗Q^*_{CC}QCC∗​ is a real number with the hypothesis F(QCC∗)=κSF(Q^*_{CC}) = \kappa_SF(QCC∗​)=κS​, which determines it uniquely since FFF is strictly increasing, and (4) is kept in its printed form. The retailer's forecast objective fixes the EM's production at q(1+α)q(1+\alpha)q(1+α), as §6.1 does after Proposition 2; clause 2 checks that the EM indeed wants to build exactly that amount at this contract. The full game in which the retailer could anticipate other EM responses is not modelled. The hypothesis QCC∗>0Q^*_{CC} > 0QCC∗​>0 makes explicit the paper's presumption that demand is almost certainly nonnegative (§3.3); without it no forecast q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 could produce QCC∗Q^*_{CC}QCC∗​. The bound ω<1\omega<1ω<1 is Proposition 3's standing case, where ψ\psiψ is finite. cˉ(ψ)\bar c(\psi)cˉ(ψ) can exceed ppp when s>0s>0s>0; no restriction cˉ(ψ)<p\bar c(\psi) < pcˉ(ψ)<p is imposed.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_TsayQF_EffQF_Model

open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory
Formal statement
namespace TsayQF.EffQF

/-- Proposition 6(a), p. 1350: when `σ_ε = 0`, the QF contract `{c̄(ψ), (α, ω)}` with
`ψ = (1 + α)/(1 − ω)` and `c̄` given by (4) is system-efficient: the retailer's unique optimal
forecast is `q̂ = Q*_CC/(1 + α)`, the EM's unique optimal production is then `q̂(1 + α) = Q*_CC`,
and the resulting expected system profit equals the centralized optimum. -/
theorem proposition_6a (D : Data) (ν : Measure ℝ) [IsProbabilityMeasure ν]
    (hΘ : StrictMono (cdf ν)) (hΘd : Differentiable ℝ (cdf ν)) (hν : MemLp id 2 ν)
    (α ω : ℝ) (hω0 : 0 ≤ ω) (hω1 : ω < 1) (hα : -ω ≤ α)
    (Qcc : ℝ) (hQcc : cdf ν Qcc = kS D) (hpos : 0 < Qcc) :
    let c := cbar D ν (psi α ω) Qcc
    let qhat := Qcc / (1 + α)
    (∀ q, 0 ≤ q → (IsMaxOn (forecastProfit D ν c α ω) (Set.Ici 0) q ↔ q = qhat)) ∧
    (∀ Q, qhat * (1 + α) ≤ Q →
      (IsMaxOn (emProfit D ν c ω qhat) (Set.Ici (qhat * (1 + α))) Q ↔ Q = qhat * (1 + α))) ∧
    (∀ Q, ccProfit D ν Q ≤
      forecastProfit D ν c α ω qhat + emProfit D ν c ω qhat (qhat * (1 + α))) := by sorry

end TsayQF.EffQF
Source
Tsay, The quantity flexibility contract and supplier-customer incentives, Management Science 45(10) (1999), p. 1350, Proposition 6(a), display (4); with p. 1348, Proposition 2 and §7, pp. 1349–1350
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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