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Gauge bound for the exact BGV multiplication noise term.

Proved
FHENoise.bgv_mul_noise_bound

by raver1975 · Sep 17, 2026 · Mathlib c5ea003 (Lean v4.30.0)

aether-catalogcryptography

Gauge bound for the exact BGV multiplication noise term. The quadratic term carries two factors of the expansion factor γ, which is the source of the γ²-type blow-up in ring-based schemes.

theorem FHENoise.bgv_mul_noise_bound(t m e m' e' : R) {mu mu' eps eps' tau : ℝ}
    (hm : G.nu m ≤ mu) (hm' : G.nu m' ≤ mu') (he : G.nu e ≤ eps)
    (he' : G.nu e' ≤ eps') (ht : G.nu t ≤ tau) :
    G.nu (e * m' + m * e' + t * (e * e')) ≤
      G.gamma * (eps * mu' + mu * eps') + G.gamma ^ 2 * tau * (eps * eps') := by sorry

Formalization Note Transplanted verbatim from the Aether Catalog source Cryptography/FHE/NoiseGrowth.lean; the statement is byte-identical to the source declaration, elaborated with autoImplicit disabled in the platform environment.

Preamble
-- Thm stub generated from Cryptography/FHE/NoiseGrowth.lean
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_Cryptography_FHE_NoiseGauge
import Definitions.Def_Cryptography_FHE_NoiseGrowth
import Definitions.Def_Cryptography_FHE_RingLWE

/-!
# Exact noise accumulation in BGV/BFV homomorphic evaluation

This file develops the *quantitative* layer that the catalog file
`Cryptography.FHE.RingLWE` leaves abstract: it tracks the actual size of the
decryption noise through homomorphic addition, multiplication, relinearization
(key switching) and bootstrapping, and proves that a circuit decrypts correctly
whenever an explicitly computed noise bound stays below the decoding radius.

## The model

A ciphertext is a **polynomial in the secret key**: `c = c₀ + c₁ X + c₂ X² + …`
with *phase* `phase s c = c.eval s`.  This is the standard "extended
ciphertext" view: fresh BGV/BFV ciphertexts have degree `1`, and multiplication
of ciphertexts is exactly multiplication of these polynomials, so that

* `phase s (c + d) = phase s c + phase s d`,
* `phase s (c * d) = phase s c * phase s d`,

i.e. **the phase map is a ring homomorphism** (`phaseHom`).  Relinearization is
modelled as *any* map `relin` that changes the phase by a small element of the
ideal `(t)` generated by the plaintext modulus — exactly what BGV key switching
guarantees.  Correctness then splits into two independent obligations:

* an *algebraic* one: the phase, read modulo `t`, is the plaintext circuit value
  (`NoiseCkt.phase_eval_mod`), true at every noise level;
* an *analytic* one: the phase norm stays under the decoding radius
  (`NoiseCkt.noise_evalEnc_le`).

The main theorem `NoiseCkt.decrypt_evalEnc` combines them.

## Main results

* `phaseHom` — the phase is a ring homomorphism in the extended-ciphertext model,
  compatible with the two-component ciphertexts of `RingLWEFHE`.
* `bgv_mul_noise_exact` / `bgv_mul_noise_bound` — the exact BGV multiplication
  noise term `e·m' + m·e' + t·e·e'` and its gauge bound.
* `NoiseCkt.noise_evalEnc_le` — the master accumulation theorem: the noise of an
  evaluated circuit is bounded by the syntactically computed `noiseBound`.
* `NoiseCkt.phase_eval_mod` — relinearization never disturbs the plaintext.
* `NoiseCkt.decrypt_evalEnc` — full correctness of noisy homomorphic evaluation.
* `noiseBound_le_iter` — the doubly exponential depth bound
  `γ·N_d ≤ (γ·B)^(2^d)` in the relinearization-free regime, and
  `mulChain_noise_eq` showing that this bound is *attained* over `ℤ`.
-/

open FHENoise

-- open removed: section is not a namespace

noncomputable section

variable {R : Type*} [CommRing R]

/-! ## 1. Ciphertexts as polynomials in the secret key -/











/-! ## 2. Noise of a ciphertext relative to a gauge -/

variable (G : NoiseGauge R)







/-! ## 3. The exact BGV multiplication noise term -/
Formal statement
theorem FHENoise.bgv_mul_noise_bound(t m e m' e' : R) {mu mu' eps eps' tau : ℝ}
    (hm : G.nu m ≤ mu) (hm' : G.nu m' ≤ mu') (he : G.nu e ≤ eps)
    (he' : G.nu e' ≤ eps') (ht : G.nu t ≤ tau) :
    G.nu (e * m' + m * e' + t * (e * e')) ≤
      G.gamma * (eps * mu' + mu * eps') + G.gamma ^ 2 * tau * (eps * eps') := by sorry
Source
https://github.com/paulklemstine/Lean/blob/53c2925a02/Catalog/Cryptography/FHE/NoiseGrowth.lean#L143

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