Proof of Theorem B, p. 32 — symmetrizing a two-good mechanism
ProvedMultiItemRev.TwoIID.symmetrizationmechanism-designp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1revenuesymmetry
Let two goods have the same one-good probability law and independent values. Average a feasible, incentive-compatible, individually rational, no-positive-transfer mechanism with its copy obtained by exchanging the goods. The resulting mechanism has the same four properties, is symmetric, and yields the same expected payment:
Symmetrization permits the later estimates to use identical diagonal allocation coordinates.
Formalization Note Independence and identical distribution are encoded by the product law on two coordinates. Measurability of the payment is part of admissibility.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MultiItemRev_TwoIID_Model open MeasureTheory open scoped NNReal ENNReal
Formal statement
namespace MultiItemRev.TwoIID
theorem symmetrization (ν : Measure ℝ≥0) [IsProbabilityMeasure ν]
(M : MultiItemRev.Decomp.Mechanism (Fin 2)) (hM : IsAdmissible M ∧ MultiItemRev.Decomp.IsNPT M) :
IsAdmissible (symmetrize M) ∧ MultiItemRev.Decomp.IsNPT (symmetrize M) ∧
IsSymmetric (symmetrize M) ∧
expRevenue (Measure.pi (fun _ : Fin 2 => ν)) (symmetrize M) =
expRevenue (Measure.pi (fun _ : Fin 2 => ν)) M := by sorry
end MultiItemRev.TwoIID
Source
Hart and Nisan, Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items, arXiv:1204.1846v3, p. 32, proof of Theorem B, symmetrization paragraph
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.