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Theorem A.3 — Round-Robin has a pure Nash equilibrium in every instance with additive valuations

Proved
StrategicAlloc.RRExists.theorem_A_3

by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

fair-divisionmechanism-designp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1pure-nash-equilibriumround-robin

Let I=(N,M,v)\mathcal I = (N, M, v)I=(N,M,v) be any instance with n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 agents, mmm goods and additive valuations with non-negative values vi(g)≥0v_i(g) \ge 0vi​(g)≥0; values may be zero and may tie. Then Round-Robin (Mechanism 1, lexicographic tie-breaking of bids) has at least one pure Nash equilibrium:

∃ b∈(R≥0m)n  ∀i∈N  ∀bi′∈R≥0m:vi(RR(bi′,b−i)i)≤vi(RR(b)i).\exists\, \mathbf b \in (\mathbb R^m_{\ge 0})^n \ \ \forall i \in N\ \ \forall \mathbf b'_i \in \mathbb R^m_{\ge 0}:\quad v_i\big(\text{RR}(\mathbf b'_i, \mathbf b_{-i})_i\big) \le v_i\big(\text{RR}(\mathbf b)_i\big).∃b∈(R≥0m​)n  ∀i∈N  ∀bi′​∈R≥0m​:vi​(RR(bi′​,b−i​)i​)≤vi​(RR(b)i​).

This extends the existence result of Aziz, Goldberg and Walsh (Theorem A.2), which needs positive values and strict preferences, to general additive valuations. Combined with Theorem 3.3 of the same paper (every PNE of Round-Robin is EF1 with respect to the true valuations), it shows that Round-Robin always has equilibria and that all of them are fair in the EF1 sense.

Formalization Note Agents are Fin n with [NeZero n], goods Fin m. The equilibrium is over bid vectors in R≥0m\mathbb R^m_{\ge 0}R≥0m​ with deviations over all such vectors, and the bundle values are the true viv_ivi​. No positivity or strictness is assumed: those are exactly what the theorem removes from Theorem A.2.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_StrategicAlloc_RRExists_Setting
Formal statement
namespace StrategicAlloc.RRExists

/-- Theorem A.3 (p. 24): for every instance with additive non-negative valuations, Round-Robin
(Mechanism 1, lexicographic tie-breaking) has at least one pure Nash equilibrium. -/
theorem theorem_A_3 {n m : ℕ} [NeZero n] (v : Fin n → Fin m → ℝ) (hv : ∀ i g, 0 ≤ v i g) :
    ∃ b : Fin n → Fin m → ℝ, StrategicAlloc.RRFair.IsPNE StrategicAlloc.RRFair.roundRobin v b := by sorry

end StrategicAlloc.RRExists
Source
Amanatidis et al., Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents, arXiv:2109.08644v2, p. 24, Theorem A.3
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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