(B.1), p. 38 — summing the first-order conditions:
ProvedPoWMining.Equilibrium.eq_B_1first-order-conditionmining-gamep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Consider the mining game with miners, reward , capacity parameter and sorted positive costs-per-hash (payoff (3.4) without the fixed cost). Let be an equilibrium hash rate profile, its aggregate, its number of active miners, and the cumulative cost of the first miners. Then and
So the aggregate hash rate is the positive root of the quadratic , which is the closed form (4.1).
Formalization Note The statement uses the cumulative cost of the first miners in the paper's order (Lean indices ); that these are exactly the active miners is the content of the preceding milestone. The paper's miner is Lean index .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_PoWMining_Equilibrium_Setting
Formal statement
namespace PoWMining.Equilibrium
/-- (B.1), p. 38: summing the first-order conditions of the `n` active miners,
`0 = ((n − 1)/H) R − c⁽ⁿ⁾ − γ H = (1/H)((n − 1) R − c⁽ⁿ⁾ H − γ H²)`, with `H = H* > 0`. -/
theorem eq_B_1 {N : ℕ} (P : Params N) (hP : P.Standing) (h : Fin N → ℝ)
(hh : IsMiningEq P h) :
0 < aggH h ∧
((activeCount h : ℝ) - 1) / aggH h * P.R - cumCost P (activeCount h) - P.γ * aggH h = 0 ∧
1 / aggH h * (((activeCount h : ℝ) - 1) * P.R - cumCost P (activeCount h) * aggH h
- P.γ * aggH h ^ 2) = 0 := by sorry
end PoWMining.Equilibrium
Source
Capponi, Ólafsson & Alsabah, Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization?, arXiv:2106.09783v1, p. 38, proof of Proposition 4.1, (B.1)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.