Sec. 4.2.2, p. 24 — the integrated retail price p_I = (1 + c(1 − 2τ²))/(2(1 − τ²)) and its monotonicity in c
ProvedRevShareCoord.Effort.Linear.integrated_priceIn the linear example, let . For every unit cost , the integrated channel's profit has exactly one maximizer over , and it is the retailer's solution under marginal-cost pricing, with , . The retail price charged there is
As a function of , is strictly increasing if , constant (equal to ) if , and strictly decreasing if .
When effort matters enough, a higher production cost lowers the integrated channel's price: the reduction in effort shrinks the market by more than the quantity effect raises the price.
Formalization Note. is excluded: at the integrated profit along is , unbounded in , and divides by zero. makes the integrated quantity positive. The page states only the strict cases; the constant case at is added to complete the trichotomy.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_RevShareCoord_Effort_Linear
namespace RevShareCoord.Effort.Linear
/-- Sec. 4.2.2, p. 24: the integrated channel's unique optimum is the retailer's solution with
`w = c`, `φ = 1`; its retail price is `p_I = (1 + c(1 − 2τ²))/(2(1 − τ²))`, which is increasing in
`c` if `τ < 1/√2`, decreasing if `τ > 1/√2` (and constant if `τ = 1/√2`). -/
theorem integrated_price (τ : ℝ) (hτ0 : 0 ≤ τ) (hτ1 : τ < 1) :
(∀ c : ℝ, 0 < c → c < 1 → ∀ x : ℝ × ℝ,
(x ∈ quadrant ∧ IsMaxOn (fun y : ℝ × ℝ => channelProfit τ c y.1 y.2) quadrant x) ↔
x = (orderQty τ 1 c, effort τ 1 (orderQty τ 1 c))) ∧
(∀ c : ℝ, 0 < c → c < 1 →
integratedPrice τ c = (1 + c * (1 - 2 * τ ^ 2)) / (2 * (1 - τ ^ 2))) ∧
(τ < 1 / Real.sqrt 2 → StrictMonoOn (integratedPrice τ) (Set.Ioo 0 1)) ∧
(τ = 1 / Real.sqrt 2 → ∀ c ∈ Set.Ioo (0 : ℝ) 1, integratedPrice τ c = 1) ∧
(1 / Real.sqrt 2 < τ → StrictAntiOn (integratedPrice τ) (Set.Ioo 0 1)) := by sorry
end RevShareCoord.Effort.Linear
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.