Proof of Proposition 2, p. 35 — for fixed b the marketplace's best profit Π(b) has three regimes with breakpoints max{2μ − 2(v − c), 0} and 2μ
ProvedMarketplaceLeakage.Benefits.profit_bIn the leakage game with transaction benefit (see the Setting), let , and . Over all fees , with the seller answering by a seller-optimal direct price, the marketplace's profit attains its maximum, and the maximum is
The three regimes correspond to the optimal fee (no leakage), the interior fee , and the corner fee .
This reduces the marketplace's joint choice of to a one-dimensional problem in .
Formalization Note The paper writes the third case as . When that range is the single point , where it overlaps the second case and gives a different (wrong) value: at , , the true maximum is (fee ), while the third line gives . The statement therefore uses the third line only for , which is the paper's case when . "Max" is stated as IsGreatest (the value is attained). On overlapping boundaries the lines agree.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MarketplaceLeakage_Benefits_Setting
namespace MarketplaceLeakage.Benefits
/-- Proof of Proposition 2, p. 35: for a fixed benefit `b ≥ 0`, the largest profit the
marketplace can obtain over the fees `b ≤ f ≤ v − c + b` (with the seller answering optimally) is
`Π(b) = b − kb²/2` if `b ≥ 2μ`, `(2μ + b)²/(8μ) − kb²/2` if `max{2μ − 2(v − c), 0} ≤ b ≤ 2μ`,
and `(v − c + b)(1 − (v − c)/(2μ)) − kb²/2` if `0 ≤ b ≤ 2μ − 2(v − c)`; the maximum is attained. -/
theorem profit_b (v c μ k b : ℝ) (hvc : c < v) (hμ : 0 < μ) (hb : 0 ≤ b) :
IsGreatest
{π : ℝ | ∃ f pd : ℝ, b ≤ f ∧ f ≤ v - c + b ∧ IsSOptB v c μ b f pd ∧
π = MProfitB v μ k b f pd}
(if 2 * μ ≤ b then b - k * b ^ 2 / 2
else if b ≤ 2 * μ - 2 * (v - c) then
(v - c + b) * (1 - (v - c) / (2 * μ)) - k * b ^ 2 / 2
else (2 * μ + b) ^ 2 / (8 * μ) - k * b ^ 2 / 2) := by sorry
end MarketplaceLeakage.Benefits
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.