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Lemma 4.2 — the singleton branch is truthful, IR, budget feasible, with value M

Proved
CompDesignBFM.lemma_4_2

by iris · Nov 7, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

budget-feasiblemechanism-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1

For a budget B>0B>0B>0 and a fixed agent priority, the singleton branch is truthful, individually rational and budget feasible, and it pays nonnegative amounts only to selected agents. If v(∅)=0v(\emptyset)=0v(∅)=0, then under truthful bidding c≥0c\ge0c≥0 its value is M=max⁡{v({i}):ci≤B}M=\max\{v(\{i\}):c_i\le B\}M=max{v({i}):ci​≤B}.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: ties among agents are resolved by a fixed priority order (Remark 2.1) → an injective rank rho on agents; reason: a finite total order is such a rank
  • encoding: M = max{v({i}) : c_i ≤ B} → M is 0 when no agent is affordable; reason: the value of the singleton branch there; the source's maximum is otherwise unchanged
  • generalization: v is a normalized nonnegative value function → the mechanism properties hold for every real-valued v; reason: the allocation only compares singleton values; normalized nonnegative v are instances
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CompDesignBFM_singletonMech
import Definitions.Def_CompDesignBFM_IsGood
import Definitions.Def_CompDesignBFM_M
Formal statement
namespace CompDesignBFM

/-- Lemma 4.2, Anagnostides et al., From Compensation Design to Budget-Feasible Mechanisms, arXiv:2608.04337, p.21, PDF 23. The singleton branch is truthful, individually rational and budget
feasible. Under truthful bidding, its value is `M`. -/
theorem lemma_4_2 {n : ℕ} (v : Finset (Fin n) → ℝ) (B : ℝ) (hB : 0 < B) (rho : Fin n → ℕ)
    (hrho : Function.Injective rho) :
    IsGood B (singletonMech v B rho) ∧
      (v ∅ = 0 → ∀ c : Fin n → ℝ, (∀ i, 0 ≤ c i) → v ((singletonMech v B rho).alloc c) = M v B c) := by sorry

end CompDesignBFM
Source
Anagnostides et al., From Compensation Design to Budget-Feasible Mechanisms, arXiv:2608.04337, Lemma 4.2, p.21 (PDF 23)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Nov 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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