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Fact 3 — xi(b+Δ)≥B(k)(b)x_i(b+\Delta)\ge B^{(k)}(b)xi​(b+Δ)≥B(k)(b), and xi(b)≥B(k)(b)x_i(b)\ge B^{(k)}(b)xi​(b)≥B(k)(b) without atoms

Proved
LargeSupplyFPA.Asymptotic.fact_3

by Shuze Chen · Nov 10, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bayes-nash-equilibriumfirst-price-auctionmulti-unit-auctionp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-of-anarchy

Consider one kkk-unit first-price auction with nnn agents, value laws VVV and any strategy profile EEE. Let xix_ixi​ be agent iii's interim allocation (uniform tie-breaking) and B(k)B^{(k)}B(k) the distribution function of the kkk-th highest bid. For every bid b≥0b\ge 0b≥0 and every agent iii:

xi(b+Δ) ≥ B(k)(b)for all Δ>0,x_i(b+\Delta)\ \ge\ B^{(k)}(b)\quad\text{for all }\Delta>0,xi​(b+Δ) ≥ B(k)(b)for all Δ>0,

and if no agent's marginal bid distribution has an atom, then xi(b)≥B(k)(b)x_i(b)\ge B^{(k)}(b)xi​(b)≥B(k)(b).

This relates the order statistic of the bids to an individual agent's chance of winning. It is used to lower-bound utilities in Theorem 1 and Lemma 4.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: a strategy is a map E_i : V_i → Δ(ℝ≥0) from values to bid distributions → a Markov kernel E i : Kernel ℝ ℝ with E i v ((−∞, 0)) = 0 for every v; reason: measurability in v is what makes the marginal bid distribution ∫ E_{i,v} dV_i defined; a law on ℝ with no mass below 0 is a law on ℝ≥0
  • encoding: B^(k)(b) = Pr[k-th highest bid ≤ b] = Pr[#{j : b_j > b} ≤ k − 1] → Pr[#{j : b_j > b} < k]; reason: identical for k ≥ 1; at k = 0 both sides of Fact 3 involve B = 0
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_LargeSupplyFPA_Asymptotic_Model
import Definitions.Def_LargeSupplyFPA_Asymptotic_Assumptions

open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory
Formal statement
namespace LargeSupplyFPA.Asymptotic

theorem fact_3 {n : ℕ} (k : ℕ) (V : Fin n → Measure ℝ) (E : Fin n → Kernel ℝ ℝ)
    (hV : IsValueProfile V) (hE : IsStrategyProfile E) (b : ℝ) (hb : 0 ≤ b) (i : Fin n) :
    (∀ Δ : ℝ, 0 < Δ → kthBidCDF k V E b ≤ alloc k V E i (b + Δ)) ∧
      (IsAtomless V E → kthBidCDF k V E b ≤ alloc k V E i b) := by sorry

end LargeSupplyFPA.Asymptotic
Source
Hartline, Shah, vonAllmen, Robust Analysis of First-Price Auctions with Large Supply, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript of November 3, 2026, sha256 2ad8363b…), p. 45, Fact 3 (Appendix A.2)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Community (Bot) · Nov 10, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 10, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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