§4.2, p. 11, (5) — in a truth-revealing equilibrium Q∗(t, m) = Qʳ(θ_t, a_m), and such an equilibrium exists iff the IC condition (5) holds
ProvedYieldCheapTalk.Truthful.ic_condition_5cheap-talkincentive-compatibilityp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1truth-revealing-equilibrium
Assume the standing assumptions of the model. Then:
- In every truth-revealing perfect Bayesian equilibrium the buyer orders the symmetric-information quantity:
- A truth-revealing equilibrium exists if and only if the IC condition (5) holds: for all in ,
This converts the equilibrium question into a pair of inequalities between closed-form order quantities: the supplier's incentive to report truthfully is the comparison of the expected orders that each report attracts.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_YieldCheapTalk_Truthful_Setting open MeasureTheory
Formal statement
namespace YieldCheapTalk.Truthful
theorem ic_condition_5 (M : Model) (hM : M.Standing) :
(∀ (Q : Level → Level → ℝ) (beta : Level → Level → Level → ℝ), M.IsPBE id Q beta →
∀ t m, Q t m = M.Qr (M.theta t) (M.a m)) ∧
((∃ (Q : Level → Level → ℝ) (beta : Level → Level → Level → ℝ), M.IsPBE id Q beta) ↔
M.IC5) := by sorry
end YieldCheapTalk.Truthful
Source
Lu, Can a Supplier’s Yield Risk Be Truthfully Communicated via Cheap Talk?, author manuscript of 14 July 2024 (MSOM, doi:10.1287/msom.2023.0089), p. 11, §4.2, (4)–(5)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.