Appendix, p. 29 — case 2 equilibrium requests satisfy seller acceptance bounds
ProvedCustomerVoice.ONoOther.equilibrium_requests_acceptedp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1seller-acceptancesignaling
Let the O-Learning model satisfy its standing assumptions and . For any separating pure-strategy equilibrium with requests and any on-path-consistent belief function, both requests lie within the corresponding seller acceptance ranges:
These are the feasibility bounds the Appendix uses before comparing the two types' incentives to imitate.
Formalization Note Acceptance uses the paper's payoff inequality, including acceptance at equality. A rejected request pays zero, so equilibrium optimality has content at this step.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CustomerVoice_ONoOther_Setting
Formal statement
namespace CustomerVoice.ONoOther
theorem equilibrium_requests_accepted (M : Model) (hM : M.Standing)
(hr : M.θH / M.θL < M.LambdaL)
(req : CustomerVoice.ALearn.BType → ℝ) (bel : ℝ → CustomerVoice.ALearn.BType) (heq : M.OSepEq req bel) :
req .H ≤ M.γ * M.θH / (M.s + M.γ * M.k) ∧
req .L ≤ M.γ * M.θL / (M.s + M.γ * M.k) := by sorry
end CustomerVoice.ONoOther
Source
Guo, The Voice of Customers in Customization, SSRN working paper 3994319 (version of 2023-11-29, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3994319), p. 29, Appendix, No Other Separating Equilibrium under the O-Learning Customization
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.