Proposition 4 — under pay parity ; for revenue is maximized at and access at
ProvedTelehealthParity.Access.proposition_4Fix parameters satisfying the standing assumptions with ; only and the duplicate-visit probability vary. There are thresholds and with
such that, for every admissible :
- if , the provider's revenue under pay parity is maximized over at , and if it is maximized at ;
- if , the patient access rate is maximized over at , and if it is maximized at ;
- if , the two objectives disagree strictly:
Under telehealth pay parity, for a moderate duplicate-visit probability the provider maximizes its revenue by committing capacity to telehealth, while patient access is maximized by an office-only practice: the provider does more work, and is paid for the duplicate visits, while seeing fewer patients.
Formalization Note Items 1–2 are Proposition 3, which defines and ; without them the thresholds would be meaningless. The paper's premise "" is part of the conclusion here (Proposition 3 gives it). Item 3 states the misalignment strictly, which is what "maximized at θ = 0, but … maximized at θ = θ*" asserts. is added (the paper allows ): with the revenue vanishes identically and the strict comparison fails.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_TelehealthParity_Access_Setting
namespace TelehealthParity.Access
theorem proposition_4 (p : Params) (hp : p.Standing) (hR : 0 < p.R) :
∃ qdag qstar : ℝ, 0 < qdag ∧ qdag < qstar ∧ qstar < 1 ∧
∀ q : ℝ, Admissible p q →
(q < qstar → IsMaxOn (revenue p q p.R) (Set.Icc 0 1) (thetaStar p q)) ∧
(qstar < q → IsMaxOn (revenue p q p.R) (Set.Icc 0 1) 0) ∧
(q < qdag → IsMaxOn (access p q) (Set.Icc 0 1) (thetaStar p q)) ∧
(qdag < q → IsMaxOn (access p q) (Set.Icc 0 1) 0) ∧
(qdag < q → q < qstar →
access p q (thetaStar p q) < access p q 0 ∧
revenue p q p.R 0 < revenue p q p.R (thetaStar p q)) := by sorry
end TelehealthParity.Access
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.