Proposition 6(i), p. 20 — equal qualities under fixed-cost encroachment
ProvedQualityEncroach.FixedCost.proposition_6_iencroachmentp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1product-qualitysubgame-perfect-equilibriumsupply-chain
Let be the quality-cost parameter and let be the manufacturer's cost per direct-channel unit. For any subgame-perfect strategy profile of the three-stage fixed-quality-cost game, if the manufacturer makes a positive quantity of direct sales on the equilibrium path, then the ratio of retailer-channel to direct-channel quality is
Thus active direct sales in equilibrium involve equal quality across the two channels, as asserted by Proposition 6(i).
Formalization Note The added excludes the manuscript's zero-cost degeneracy, at which its Claim 3 does not force . Subgame perfection is required at every feasible history.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_QualityEncroach_FixedCost_Game
Formal statement
namespace QualityEncroach.FixedCost
/-- Proposition 6(i), p. 20: in an encroaching subgame-perfect equilibrium
the two channels carry the same quality. The additional `0 < c` excludes the
zero-selling-cost counterexample to the printed statement. -/
theorem proposition_6_i (k c : ℝ) (hk : 0 < k) (hc : 0 < c)
(σ : Profile) (hσ : IsSPE k c σ) (henc : 0 < σ.path.qM) :
σ.t = 1 := by sorry
end QualityEncroach.FixedCost
Source
Ha, Long & Nasiry, Quality in Supply Chain Encroachment, authors' manuscript, SSRN 3970373, p. 20, Proposition 6(i); p. 37, proof
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.