Theorem 3 — atomless approximation for nonnegative values
ProvedLargeSupplyFPA.Asymptotic.theorem_3_nonnegative_valuesIn a multi-unit first-price auction with nonnegative values, every -approximate Bayes–Nash equilibrium can be transformed, for every , into an atomless -approximate Bayes–Nash equilibrium with the same expected welfare. An almost-sure upper bound on any conditional bid distribution becomes the upper bound .
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_LargeSupplyFPA_Asymptotic_Model import Definitions.Def_LargeSupplyFPA_Asymptotic_Assumptions open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory Set
Formal statement
namespace LargeSupplyFPA.Asymptotic
theorem theorem_3_nonnegative_values {n : ℕ} (k : ℕ) (V : Fin n → Measure ℝ) (E : Fin n → Kernel ℝ ℝ) (ε : ℝ)
(hV : IsValueProfile V) (hE : IsStrategyProfile E) (hBNE : IsApproxBNE k V E ε)
(hValue : ∀ i, ∀ v ∈ (V i).support, 0 ≤ v) (ω : ℝ) (hω : 0 < ω) :
∃ Et : Fin n → Kernel ℝ ℝ, IsStrategyProfile Et ∧
IsApproxBNE k V Et (ε + ω) ∧
IsAtomless V Et ∧ welfare k V E = welfare k V Et ∧
(∀ i v t, E i v (Iic t) = 1 → Et i v (Iic (t + ω)) = 1) := by sorry
end LargeSupplyFPA.AsymptoticSource
Hartline, Shah, and vonAllmen, Robust Analysis of First-Price Auctions with Large Supply, Theorem 3 and its proof, pp. 29–33. https://github.com/sigact-stoc/stoc2027/releases/download/papers-2/1201.pdf. This version makes nonnegativity of supported values explicit and states the bound on bid increases used in Theorem 2.