Proposition 3, PDF p. 19 — the mixed merger {AB,C} is the equilibrium structure iff α(1−2α)/(1−3α) < k < 1−2α; otherwise {A,B,C}
ProvedEndogMerger.SymLoyal.proposition_3Three firms sell a homogeneous product to a unit mass of buyers with reservation value ; each firm has loyal buyers, , and the other buyers switch to the cheapest firm. Firm has ample capacity and the small firms , have capacity each, . Using the Table A1 equilibrium profits, call a market structure an equilibrium structure according to conditions (1a)–(2b): the mixed merger when (1a) and (1b) hold, the small merger when (2a) and (2b) hold, and the independent structure when neither holds. Let . Then
In particular the small merger of the two capacity-constrained firms is never an equilibrium structure, and the large firm merges with a small rival exactly when the small firms' capacity is intermediate.
Formalization Note The hypotheses (every region of the analysis requires it) and (implicit, is the reservation value) are added; is the range of Table A1, and firm 's capacity is not modelled. The profits are the Table A1 expressions, defined directly; the game-theoretic derivation of Table A1 is not formalized. "Is the equilibrium structure" is rendered as: the set of equilibrium structures is exactly that singleton.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_EndogMerger_SymLoyal_Setting
namespace EndogMerger.SymLoyal
theorem proposition_3 (α k r : ℝ) (hα0 : 0 < α) (hα3 : α < 1 / 3) (hαk : α < k) (hk1 : k < 1)
(hr : 0 < r) :
(kStar α < k ∧ k < 1 - 2 * α →
{S | IsEquilibriumStructure α k r S} = {MarketStructure.mixed}) ∧
(¬ (kStar α < k ∧ k < 1 - 2 * α) →
{S | IsEquilibriumStructure α k r S} = {MarketStructure.indep}) := by sorry
end EndogMerger.SymLoyal
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.