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Proposition 3, PDF p. 19 — the mixed merger {AB,C} is the equilibrium structure iff α(1−2α)/(1−3α) < k < 1−2α; otherwise {A,B,C}

Proved
EndogMerger.SymLoyal.proposition_3

by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

equilibrium-structuremergerp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-competitionstrong-nash

Three firms sell a homogeneous product to a unit mass of buyers with reservation value r>0r>0r>0; each firm has α\alphaα loyal buyers, 0<α<1/30<\alpha<1/30<α<1/3, and the other 1−3α1-3\alpha1−3α buyers switch to the cheapest firm. Firm AAA has ample capacity and the small firms BBB, CCC have capacity kkk each, α<k<1\alpha<k<1α<k<1. Using the Table A1 equilibrium profits, call a market structure an equilibrium structure according to conditions (1a)–(2b): the mixed merger {AB,C}\{AB,C\}{AB,C} when (1a) and (1b) hold, the small merger {A,BC}\{A,BC\}{A,BC} when (2a) and (2b) hold, and the independent structure {A,B,C}\{A,B,C\}{A,B,C} when neither holds. Let k∗=α(1−2α)/(1−3α)k^*=\alpha(1-2\alpha)/(1-3\alpha)k∗=α(1−2α)/(1−3α). Then

{S:S is an equilibrium structure}={{{AB,C}}if k∗<k<1−2α,{{A,B,C}}otherwise.\{S : S\text{ is an equilibrium structure}\}= \begin{cases} \bigl\{\{AB,C\}\bigr\} & \text{if } k^*<k<1-2\alpha,\\[2pt] \bigl\{\{A,B,C\}\bigr\} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}{S:S is an equilibrium structure}={{{AB,C}}{{A,B,C}}​if k∗<k<1−2α,otherwise.​

In particular the small merger of the two capacity-constrained firms is never an equilibrium structure, and the large firm merges with a small rival exactly when the small firms' capacity is intermediate.

Formalization Note The hypotheses 0<α0<\alpha0<α (every region of the analysis requires it) and r>0r>0r>0 (implicit, rrr is the reservation value) are added; k<1k<1k<1 is the range of Table A1, and firm AAA's capacity is not modelled. The profits are the Table A1 expressions, defined directly; the game-theoretic derivation of Table A1 is not formalized. "Is the equilibrium structure" is rendered as: the set of equilibrium structures is exactly that singleton.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_EndogMerger_SymLoyal_Setting
Formal statement
namespace EndogMerger.SymLoyal
theorem proposition_3 (α k r : ℝ) (hα0 : 0 < α) (hα3 : α < 1 / 3) (hαk : α < k) (hk1 : k < 1)
    (hr : 0 < r) :
    (kStar α < k ∧ k < 1 - 2 * α →
      {S | IsEquilibriumStructure α k r S} = {MarketStructure.mixed}) ∧
    (¬ (kStar α < k ∧ k < 1 - 2 * α) →
      {S | IsEquilibriumStructure α k r S} = {MarketStructure.indep}) := by sorry
end EndogMerger.SymLoyal
Source
Wang, Wu, Tang & Dai, Endogenous merger decisions among competitors: impact of limited capacity and loyal segments, Management Science (2024), accepted manuscript, PDF p. 19, Proposition 3; proof Appendix H, PDF pp. 48–49
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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