(4), App. B, PDF p. 33 — under pay-by-delivery the supplier produces exactly q below c/(α(1−θ)), anything in [q, q/α] at it, and exactly q/α above it
ProvedYieldPostpone.Interplay.eq_4p2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1production-inflationrandom-yieldsupply-chain
Consider a pay-by-delivery scenario (DA or DR) with parameters , , and cost . Fix a wholesale price with and an order . The supplier's expected profit from producing is
Let .
- If , then is the unique maximizer of over , and the delivered quantity is (that is, when and when ).
- If , the maximizers of over are exactly the with ; in particular the page's choice is optimal.
- If , then is the unique maximizer, and the delivered quantity is in both yield states.
This is the supplier's production response used in every pay-by-delivery equilibrium: below it never inflates production, above it inflates to secure full delivery.
Formalization Note The page assigns the tie to inflation. At every is optimal, so the tie is a selection, not a property of the maximizers: the statement gives the whole set of maximizers at (which contains the page's ), and the mission's equilibrium predicate selects there (see the Setting). The order is assumed; at the only maximizer is .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_YieldPostpone_Interplay_Setting
Formal statement
namespace YieldPostpone.Interplay
theorem eq_4 (P : Params) (hP : P.Valid) (c : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c) (hcμ : c < P.a * μ P / P.b)
(k : Scenario) (hk : k.byDelivery = true) (w q : ℝ) (hw : wAdm P c k w) (hq : 0 < q) :
(w < c / (P.α * (1 - P.θ)) →
(∀ Q : ℝ, 0 ≤ Q →
((∀ Q' : ℝ, 0 ≤ Q' → supplierProfit P c k w Q' q ≤ supplierProfit P c k w Q q) ↔ Q = q)) ∧
delivered 1 q q = q ∧ delivered P.α q q = P.α * q) ∧
(w = c / (P.α * (1 - P.θ)) →
∀ Q : ℝ, 0 ≤ Q →
((∀ Q' : ℝ, 0 ≤ Q' → supplierProfit P c k w Q' q ≤ supplierProfit P c k w Q q) ↔
(q ≤ Q ∧ Q ≤ q / P.α))) ∧
(c / (P.α * (1 - P.θ)) < w →
(∀ Q : ℝ, 0 ≤ Q →
((∀ Q' : ℝ, 0 ≤ Q' → supplierProfit P c k w Q' q ≤ supplierProfit P c k w Q q) ↔
Q = q / P.α)) ∧
delivered 1 (q / P.α) q = q ∧ delivered P.α (q / P.α) q = q) := by sorry
end YieldPostpone.Interplay
Source
Geng, Guo, Xiao, Yang, Supply Risk Mitigation in a Decentralized Supply Chain: Pricing Postponement or Payment Postponement?, SSRN 3546872 (author version), App. B, PDF p. 33 (appendix p. 1), display (4)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.