§4.1, p. 11 — the optimal monetization intensity r(s) = δs/(2c), increasing in s
ProvedRetailPrivacy.SingleFirm.optimal_intensitydata-monetizationp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1privacyquadratic-optimization
Let , , and let be the number of consumers who disclose data. The firm's downside exploitation profit at intensity is . Then
maximizes over , it is the only maximizer, and it is strictly increasing in .
This is the last stage of the -mode game: the firm's exploitation intensity as a function of the realized disclosing quantity, which enters the rational-expectations condition.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_RetailPrivacy_SingleFirm_Model
Formal statement
namespace RetailPrivacy.SingleFirm
theorem optimal_intensity (c δ s : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c) (hδ0 : 0 < δ) (hδ1 : δ < 1) (hs : 0 ≤ s) :
IsMaxOn (fun r => dataProfit c δ s r) (Set.Ici 0) (δ * s / (2 * c)) ∧
(∀ r ∈ Set.Ici (0 : ℝ), IsMaxOn (fun r' => dataProfit c δ s r') (Set.Ici 0) r →
r = δ * s / (2 * c)) ∧
StrictMono (fun s' : ℝ => δ * s' / (2 * c)) := by sorry
end RetailPrivacy.SingleFirm
Source
Xu, Wang & Zhang, Consumer Privacy in Online Retail Supply Chains, author manuscript (Management Science, forthcoming; version of November 2024), p. 11, §4.1, last paragraph
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.