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Theorem 3.1 — strong canonical cooperative equilibria lie in the core; under (9) the core lies in the weak ones

Proved
FuzzyGames.NTUCore.theorem_3_1

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

cooperative-gamescoreequilibriump2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let VVV be a fuzzy game without side payments: for every τ∈R+n\tau \in \mathbb{R}^n_+τ∈R+n​, V(τ)V(\tau)V(τ) is a nonempty, closed, convex subset of Rτ\mathbb{R}^\tauRτ, comprehensive and bounded above, and V(tτ)=tV(τ)V(t\tau) = tV(\tau)V(tτ)=tV(τ) for t>0t > 0t>0 (§3 (3)). Then:

  1. every strong canonical cooperative equilibrium of VVV belongs to the core of VVV;
  2. if moreover VVV satisfies
V(τ+σ)⊇V(τ)+V(σ)for all τ,σ∈R+n(9)V(\tau+\sigma) \supseteq V(\tau)+V(\sigma)\qquad\text{for all } \tau,\sigma\in\mathbb{R}^n_+ \tag{9}V(τ+σ)⊇V(τ)+V(σ)for all τ,σ∈R+n​(9)

and n≥1n \ge 1n≥1, then the core of VVV is contained in the set of weak canonical cooperative equilibria.

Here c∈V(τN)c \in V(\tau^N)c∈V(τN) is a weak (resp. strong) canonical cooperative equilibrium if some λˉ\bar\lambdaλˉ in the simplex MnM^nMn (resp. with all λˉi>0\bar\lambda^i > 0λˉi>0) satisfies ∑iλˉiτici≥v(τ,λˉ)\sum_i\bar\lambda^i\tau_i c_i \ge v(\tau,\bar\lambda)∑i​λˉiτi​ci​≥v(τ,λˉ) for every τ∈[0,1]n\tau\in[0,1]^nτ∈[0,1]n.

The theorem sandwiches the core between the two kinds of equilibria; the minisup argument behind (b) is what later makes Theorem 5.1's "and thus" step work.

Formalization Note. The paper prints (9) as "τ,σ⊂R+n\tau,\sigma \subset \mathbb{R}^n_+τ,σ⊂R+n​", a misprint for τ,σ∈R+n\tau,\sigma\in\mathbb{R}^n_+τ,σ∈R+n​ (as §5 (1) prints it). The paper leaves n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 implicit; for n=0n = 0n=0 the simplex MnM^nMn is empty while the core is not, so part (b) carries the hypothesis 0<n0 < n0<n.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_FuzzyGames_NTUCore_Basic

open Set Finset Pointwise
Formal statement
namespace FuzzyGames.NTUCore

/-- Theorem 3.1 (§3, p. 5): (a) every strong canonical cooperative equilibrium is in the core;
(b) under superadditivity (9) (and `n ≥ 1`), the core is contained in the set of weak canonical
cooperative equilibria. -/
theorem theorem_3_1 {n : ℕ} {V : (Fin n → ℝ) → Set (Fin n → ℝ)} (hV : IsNTUFuzzyGame V) :
    strongCCE V ⊆ fuzzyCore V ∧
      (Superadditive V → 0 < n → fuzzyCore V ⊆ weakCCE V) := by sorry

end FuzzyGames.NTUCore
Source
Aubin, Cooperative Fuzzy Games, Math. Oper. Res. 6(1) (1981), Theorem 3.1 and (9), p. 5
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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