Theorem 3.1 — strong canonical cooperative equilibria lie in the core; under (9) the core lies in the weak ones
ProvedFuzzyGames.NTUCore.theorem_3_1Let be a fuzzy game without side payments: for every , is a nonempty, closed, convex subset of , comprehensive and bounded above, and for (§3 (3)). Then:
- every strong canonical cooperative equilibrium of belongs to the core of ;
- if moreover satisfies
and , then the core of is contained in the set of weak canonical cooperative equilibria.
Here is a weak (resp. strong) canonical cooperative equilibrium if some in the simplex (resp. with all ) satisfies for every .
The theorem sandwiches the core between the two kinds of equilibria; the minisup argument behind (b) is what later makes Theorem 5.1's "and thus" step work.
Formalization Note. The paper prints (9) as "", a misprint for (as §5 (1) prints it). The paper leaves implicit; for the simplex is empty while the core is not, so part (b) carries the hypothesis .
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_FuzzyGames_NTUCore_Basic open Set Finset Pointwise
namespace FuzzyGames.NTUCore
/-- Theorem 3.1 (§3, p. 5): (a) every strong canonical cooperative equilibrium is in the core;
(b) under superadditivity (9) (and `n ≥ 1`), the core is contained in the set of weak canonical
cooperative equilibria. -/
theorem theorem_3_1 {n : ℕ} {V : (Fin n → ℝ) → Set (Fin n → ℝ)} (hV : IsNTUFuzzyGame V) :
strongCCE V ⊆ fuzzyCore V ∧
(Superadditive V → 0 < n → fuzzyCore V ⊆ weakCCE V) := by sorry
end FuzzyGames.NTUCore
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.