Displays (13)–(15), pp. 3345–3346 — the price-discrimination optimum: N_S^D, N_B^D, N_j^D (fn. 15), p^D, f_j^D, Π^D = v²/D
ProvedTwoSidedPD.Baseline.discrimination_equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-discriminationquadratic-optimizationtwo-sided-markets
Consider the baseline two-sided platform with , and Assumption 1, and write .
Under price discrimination the platform's problem has a solution, and every solution satisfies
where and . The participation by type is footnote 15.
These closed forms are the discrimination side of every welfare comparison in Proposition 2.
Formalization Note. The optimum is a global maximizer of over , written with the low type second and the high type third; existence is part of the statement.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_TwoSidedPD_Baseline_Setting
Formal statement
namespace TwoSidedPD.Baseline
theorem discrimination_equilibrium (v b θH θL : ℝ) (hL : 0 < θL) (hLH : θL < θH) (hb : 0 < b)
(hA : Assumption1 v b θH θL) :
(∃ y : ℝ × ℝ × ℝ, IsDiscrOpt v b θH θL y) ∧
∀ y : ℝ × ℝ × ℝ, IsDiscrOpt v b θH θL y →
y.2.1 + y.2.2 = v * (2 * b + θL + θH) / Dden b θH θL ∧
y.1 = 2 * v / Dden b θH θL ∧
y.2.1 = v * (b + θL) / Dden b θH θL ∧
y.2.2 = v * (b + θH) / Dden b θH θL ∧
PD v b y.1 y.2.1 y.2.2 = v * (2 - θH ^ 2 - θL ^ 2 - b * (θH + θL)) / Dden b θH θL ∧
FDH θH y.1 y.2.2 = v * (θH - b) / Dden b θH θL ∧
FDL θL y.1 y.2.1 = v * (θL - b) / Dden b θH θL ∧
profitD v b θH θL y = v ^ 2 / Dden b θH θL := by sorry
end TwoSidedPD.Baseline
Source
de Cornière, Mantovani & Shekhar, Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Two-Sided Markets, Management Science 71(4) (2025), pp. 3345–3346, §4.2.2, displays (13)–(15); p. 3355, footnote 15
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.