Theorem 15.2: the VCG vector is the bidder-dominant core point when it lies in the core, and otherwise no bidder-dominant point exists and the auctioneer's VCG payoff is below every core payoff
ProvedSupplyChainTheory.vcg_bidder_dominantauctionscooperative-gamescoreoperations-researchvcg
Theorem 15.2. If the VCG payoff vector lies in the core, then it is the bidder-dominant point; otherwise, there is no bidder-dominant point in the core, and the auctioneer's VCG payoff is strictly less than the smallest of the auctioneer's core payoffs, for every .
The first part is Lemma 15.1. For the second, any core vector pays every bidder at most its VCG payoff and some bidder strictly less, so it pays the auctioneer strictly more than ; and the core vector of Lemma 15.1 for that bidder shows is not bidder dominant. The theorem says the VCG auction's revenue falls below every competitive outcome unless its payoff vector is in the core.
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_SupplyChainTheory_auctions
Formal statement
namespace SupplyChainTheory
theorem vcg_bidder_dominant {n : ℕ} (V : Finset (Fin (n + 1)) → ℝ) (hV : IsCoalitionalValue V) :
(InCore V Finset.univ (vcgPayoff V Finset.univ) → BidderDominant V Finset.univ (vcgPayoff V Finset.univ))
∧ (¬ InCore V Finset.univ (vcgPayoff V Finset.univ) →
(¬ ∃ π, BidderDominant V Finset.univ π)
∧ ∀ π, InCore V Finset.univ π → vcgPayoff V Finset.univ 0 < π 0) := by sorry
end SupplyChainTheory
Source
Lawrence V. Snyder and Zuo-Jun Max Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley 2019, DOI 10.1002/9781119584445, p. 607, Sect. 15.4.3, Theorem 15.2 and its proof
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.