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Theorem 3 — for a superadditive game the fair allocation rule is totally stable

Proved
CooperationGraphs.FairRule.theorem_3

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

cooperation-graphscooperative-gamesp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let v∈RCLv\in\mathbb R^{CL}v∈RCL be a superadditive game in characteristic function form,

vS∪T≥vS+vTfor all S,T∈CL with S∩T=∅,v_{S\cup T}\ge v_S+v_T\qquad\text{for all } S,T\in CL \text{ with } S\cap T=\emptyset,vS∪T​≥vS​+vT​for all S,T∈CL with S∩T=∅,

and let Y:GR→RNY:GR\to\mathbb R^NY:GR→RN be the fair allocation rule for vvv (it satisfies the efficiency condition (7) and the equity condition (10)). Then YYY is totally stable:

Yn(g)≥Yn(g∖n:m)for every graph g∈GR and every link n:m∈g.Y_n(g)\ge Y_n(g\setminus n{:}m)\qquad\text{for every graph } g\in GR \text{ and every link } n{:}m\in g.Yn​(g)≥Yn​(g∖n:m)for every graph g∈GR and every link n:m∈g.

In a superadditive game, under the fair allocation rule no player ever loses by forming an additional cooperation link; in particular the complete cooperation structure is stable.

Formalization Note. The paper assumes a nonempty player set, stated as 0<n0<n0<n. "The fair allocation rule" is stated as "every fair allocation rule", which is faithful because Theorem 1 gives existence and uniqueness; the hypotheses are satisfiable (a local check exhibits a fair rule of a superadditive game). Superadditivity quantifies over nonempty coalitions only, as CLCLCL excludes ∅\emptyset∅; the game's value at ∅\emptyset∅ is never read.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CooperationGraphs_FairRule_Basic
Formal statement
namespace CooperationGraphs.FairRule

open Finset
open scoped Classical

/-- Theorem 3 (p. 8): if `v` is superadditive, then the fair allocation rule for `v` is totally
stable. -/
theorem theorem_3 {n : ℕ} (hn : 0 < n) (v : Game n) (hv : IsSuperadditive v) (Y : Rule n) (hY : IsFair v Y) :
    IsTotallyStable Y := by sorry

end CooperationGraphs.FairRule
Source
Myerson, Graphs and Cooperation in Games, Discussion Paper No. 246 (Sept. 1976), Theorem 3, p. 8
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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