Theorem 3 — for a superadditive game the fair allocation rule is totally stable
ProvedCooperationGraphs.FairRule.theorem_3Let be a superadditive game in characteristic function form,
and let be the fair allocation rule for (it satisfies the efficiency condition (7) and the equity condition (10)). Then is totally stable:
In a superadditive game, under the fair allocation rule no player ever loses by forming an additional cooperation link; in particular the complete cooperation structure is stable.
Formalization Note. The paper assumes a nonempty player set, stated as . "The fair allocation rule" is stated as "every fair allocation rule", which is faithful because Theorem 1 gives existence and uniqueness; the hypotheses are satisfiable (a local check exhibits a fair rule of a superadditive game). Superadditivity quantifies over nonempty coalitions only, as excludes ; the game's value at is never read.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CooperationGraphs_FairRule_Basic
namespace CooperationGraphs.FairRule
open Finset
open scoped Classical
/-- Theorem 3 (p. 8): if `v` is superadditive, then the fair allocation rule for `v` is totally
stable. -/
theorem theorem_3 {n : ℕ} (hn : 0 < n) (v : Game n) (hv : IsSuperadditive v) (Y : Rule n) (hY : IsFair v Y) :
IsTotallyStable Y := by sorry
end CooperationGraphs.FairRule
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.