§4.1, p. 10 — the manufacturer's stage-3 best response q^U_M(q_R,w,u) = (1/2 − q_R/2 − c/(2u) − ku/2)⁺
ProvedQualityEncroach.Uniform.stage3_best_responsedual-channelencroachmentp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1supply-chain
Let , , and consider the last stage of the encroachment game with uniform quality, after the manufacturer has chosen with and the retailer has ordered . The manufacturer chooses her direct quantity to maximize
The unique maximizer over is
This is the first step of the backward induction of §4.1.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_QualityEncroach_Uniform_Game
Formal statement
namespace QualityEncroach.Uniform
/-- §4.1, p. 10: given `(w, u, q_R)` with `u > 0` and `q_R ≥ 0`, the manufacturer's unique best direct quantity
over `q_M ≥ 0` is `q^U_M(q_R, w, u) = (1/2 − q_R/2 − c/(2u) − ku/2)⁺`. -/
theorem stage3_best_response (k c : ℝ) (hk : 0 < k) (hc : 0 ≤ c) (w u qR : ℝ)
(hu : 0 < u) (hqR : 0 ≤ qR) :
0 ≤ qUM_br k c qR w u ∧
∀ qM : ℝ, 0 ≤ qM → qM ≠ qUM_br k c qR w u →
mfrPayoff k c ⟨w, u, qR, qM⟩ < mfrPayoff k c ⟨w, u, qR, qUM_br k c qR w u⟩ := by sorry
end QualityEncroach.Uniform
Source
Ha, Long & Nasiry, Quality in Supply Chain Encroachment, authors' manuscript, SSRN 3970373, pp. 9–10, §4.1, display at the foot of p. 9 and the first line of p. 10
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.