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Non-malleability: same intent, verifying scripts, native witness programs — same txid

Proved
BitcoinMalleability.txid_determined

by pitimespi · Oct 29, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bip141bitcoinbitcoin-mainnetconsensusformal-verificationlightningmalleabilitysegwittxid

For flags with WITNESS, a ledger uuu and two transactions with the same intent (same version, prevouts, sequence numbers, outputs and lock time), both of whose scripts verify against uuu, where the inputs spend native witness programs: txid tx = txid tx'. No choice of signatures or witnesses — by the signer, or by a third party re-encoding them — changes the identifier of a valid spend. This is the BIP141 property that second-layer protocols (payment channels) rely on to refer to unconfirmed transactions by txid.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinMalleability
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinActivation
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinSer
open BitcoinMalleability BitcoinSer BitcoinBlockV2
Formal statement
theorem BitcoinMalleability.txid_determined (f : BitcoinActivation.ScriptFlags) (u : Ledger)
    (tx tx' : BitcoinSer.Tx) (hf : f.witness = true)
    (hI : BitcoinMalleability.intentOf tx = BitcoinMalleability.intentOf tx')
    (h : BitcoinBlockV2.inputScriptsOk f u tx = true) (h' : BitcoinBlockV2.inputScriptsOk f u tx' = true)
    (hw : BitcoinMalleability.SpendsWitnessPrograms u tx) :
    BitcoinSer.txid tx = BitcoinSer.txid tx' := by sorry
Source
Bitcoin Core a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48: VerifyScript (SCRIPT_ERR_WITNESS_MALLEATED, SCRIPT_ERR_WITNESS_MALLEATED_P2SH), src/script/interpreter.cpp: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48/src/script/interpreter.cpp; CTransaction::ComputeHash, SerializeTransaction (primitives/transaction.h, transaction.cpp); CheckInputScripts (validation.cpp); BIP141 (Transaction ID)
Read-back

What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-fable-5-1 (independent sub-agent, blind: Lean code + auditor instructions only)

Read-back: BitcoinMalleability.txid_determined

Statement in words

For every consensus flag set fff, every ledger uuu and every two transactions tx,tx′\mathrm{tx}, \mathrm{tx}'tx,tx′: if the witness flag of fff is on, tx\mathrm{tx}tx and tx′\mathrm{tx}'tx′ have the same intent, each of tx\mathrm{tx}tx and tx′\mathrm{tx}'tx′ has all its input scripts verifying against uuu under fff, and every input of tx\mathrm{tx}tx (the hypothesis is stated for tx\mathrm{tx}tx only) spends in uuu an output whose script is a witness program, then tx\mathrm{tx}tx and tx′\mathrm{tx}'tx′ have the same transaction identifier.

Binders and hypotheses

  • fff: a record of seven Booleans (p2sh,witness,taproot,dersig,cltv,csv,nulldummy)(\mathrm{p2sh}, \mathrm{witness}, \mathrm{taproot}, \mathrm{dersig}, \mathrm{cltv}, \mathrm{csv}, \mathrm{nulldummy})(p2sh,witness,taproot,dersig,cltv,csv,nulldummy); arbitrary except as stated.
  • uuu: a ledger: a finite association list of (outpoint, coin) pairs; outpoint (h,n)(h, n)(h,n) with hhh a byte string of any length and n∈Nn \in \mathbb Nn∈N; coin (out,height,isCoinbase)(\mathrm{out}, \mathrm{height}, \mathrm{isCoinbase})(out,height,isCoinbase) with out=(nValue∈Z,scriptPubKey)\mathrm{out} = (\mathrm{nValue} \in \mathbb Z, \mathrm{scriptPubKey})out=(nValue∈Z,scriptPubKey). Keys need not be distinct.
  • tx,tx′\mathrm{tx}, \mathrm{tx}'tx,tx′: transactions (version∈N,vin,vout,nLockTime∈N)(\mathrm{version} \in \mathbb N, \mathrm{vin}, \mathrm{vout}, \mathrm{nLockTime} \in \mathbb N)(version∈N,vin,vout,nLockTime∈N) with inputs (prevout,scriptSig,nSequence,witness)(\mathrm{prevout}, \mathrm{scriptSig}, \mathrm{nSequence}, \mathrm{witness})(prevout,scriptSig,nSequence,witness) and outputs (nValue∈Z,scriptPubKey)(\mathrm{nValue} \in \mathbb Z, \mathrm{scriptPubKey})(nValue∈Z,scriptPubKey). No well-formedness is assumed.
  • hfh_fhf​: f.witness=truef.\mathrm{witness} = \mathrm{true}f.witness=true.
  • hIh_IhI​: intentOf(tx)=intentOf(tx′)\mathrm{intentOf}(\mathrm{tx}) = \mathrm{intentOf}(\mathrm{tx}')intentOf(tx)=intentOf(tx′).
  • hhh: inputScriptsOk(f,u,tx)=true\mathrm{inputScriptsOk}(f, u, \mathrm{tx}) = \mathrm{true}inputScriptsOk(f,u,tx)=true.
  • h′h'h′: inputScriptsOk(f,u,tx′)=true\mathrm{inputScriptsOk}(f, u, \mathrm{tx}') = \mathrm{true}inputScriptsOk(f,u,tx′)=true (same fff, same uuu).
  • hwh_whw​: SpendsWitnessPrograms(u,tx)\mathrm{SpendsWitnessPrograms}(u, \mathrm{tx})SpendsWitnessPrograms(u,tx). There is no corresponding hypothesis for tx′\mathrm{tx}'tx′.

Conclusion

txid(tx)=txid(tx′),\mathrm{txid}(\mathrm{tx}) = \mathrm{txid}(\mathrm{tx}'),txid(tx)=txid(tx′),

an equality of 32-byte digests.

The notions, unfolded

Same intent. intentOf(t)=(t.version,[(i.prevout,i.nSequence)∣i∈t.vin],t.vout,t.nLockTime)\mathrm{intentOf}(t) = (t.\mathrm{version}, [(i.\mathrm{prevout}, i.\mathrm{nSequence}) \mid i \in t.\mathrm{vin}], t.\mathrm{vout}, t.\mathrm{nLockTime})intentOf(t)=(t.version,[(i.prevout,i.nSequence)∣i∈t.vin],t.vout,t.nLockTime). So hIh_IhI​ says exactly: tx.version=tx′.version\mathrm{tx}.\mathrm{version} = \mathrm{tx}'.\mathrm{version}tx.version=tx′.version; tx\mathrm{tx}tx and tx′\mathrm{tx}'tx′ have the same number mmm of inputs and, for each position j<mj < mj<m, the jjj-th inputs have equal outpoints and equal sequence numbers; tx.vout=tx′.vout\mathrm{tx}.\mathrm{vout} = \mathrm{tx}'.\mathrm{vout}tx.vout=tx′.vout as lists (same values and scripts in the same order); tx.nLockTime=tx′.nLockTime\mathrm{tx}.\mathrm{nLockTime} = \mathrm{tx}'.\mathrm{nLockTime}tx.nLockTime=tx′.nLockTime. The jjj-th inputs may have different scriptSig\mathrm{scriptSig}scriptSigs and different witness lists; nothing else may differ. In particular the two transactions reference the same outpoints at the same positions, so the coins accessCoin(u,⋅)\mathrm{accessCoin}(u, \cdot)accessCoin(u,⋅) looked up for position jjj are the same for both.

Transaction identifier. txid(t)=SHA256(SHA256(ser0(t)))\mathrm{txid}(t) = \mathrm{SHA256}(\mathrm{SHA256}(\mathrm{ser}_0(t)))txid(t)=SHA256(SHA256(ser0​(t))) with

ser0(t)=LE4(version) ∥ CS(∣vin∣) ∥ ∥i∈vin(i.prevout.h ∥ LE4(i.prevout.n) ∥ CS(∣i.scriptSig∣) ∥ i.scriptSig ∥ LE4(i.nSequence)) ∥ CS(∣vout∣) ∥ ∥o∈vout(LE8±(o.nValue) ∥ CS(∣o.scriptPubKey∣) ∥ o.scriptPubKey) ∥ LE4(nLockTime),\mathrm{ser}_0(t) = \mathrm{LE}_4(\mathrm{version}) \,\|\, \mathrm{CS}(|\mathrm{vin}|) \,\|\, \big\|_{i \in \mathrm{vin}} \big( i.\mathrm{prevout}.h \,\|\, \mathrm{LE}_4(i.\mathrm{prevout}.n) \,\|\, \mathrm{CS}(|i.\mathrm{scriptSig}|) \,\|\, i.\mathrm{scriptSig} \,\|\, \mathrm{LE}_4(i.\mathrm{nSequence}) \big) \,\|\, \mathrm{CS}(|\mathrm{vout}|) \,\|\, \big\|_{o \in \mathrm{vout}} \big( \mathrm{LE}_8^{\pm}(o.\mathrm{nValue}) \,\|\, \mathrm{CS}(|o.\mathrm{scriptPubKey}|) \,\|\, o.\mathrm{scriptPubKey} \big) \,\|\, \mathrm{LE}_4(\mathrm{nLockTime}),ser0​(t)=LE4​(version)∥CS(∣vin∣)∥​i∈vin​(i.prevout.h∥LE4​(i.prevout.n)∥CS(∣i.scriptSig∣)∥i.scriptSig∥LE4​(i.nSequence))∥CS(∣vout∣)∥​o∈vout​(LE8±​(o.nValue)∥CS(∣o.scriptPubKey∣)∥o.scriptPubKey)∥LE4​(nLockTime),

where LE4(x)\mathrm{LE}_4(x)LE4​(x) is the 4-byte little-endian encoding of x mod 232x \bmod 2^{32}xmod232, LE8±(z)\mathrm{LE}_8^{\pm}(z)LE8±​(z) the 8-byte two's-complement little-endian encoding of z mod 264z \bmod 2^{64}zmod264, CS\mathrm{CS}CS the CompactSize encoding, and the outpoint hash is written raw at whatever length it has. Witnesses never appear; every scriptSig\mathrm{scriptSig}scriptSig appears with its length prefix. Under hIh_IhI​ the serializations of tx\mathrm{tx}tx and tx′\mathrm{tx}'tx′ can differ only in the scriptSig\mathrm{scriptSig}scriptSig fields (and their length prefixes), so the conclusion asserts the double-SHA-256 digests agree despite any such difference.

Lookup. accessCoin(u,o)\mathrm{accessCoin}(u, o)accessCoin(u,o) is the coin of the first pair of uuu whose outpoint equals ooo, or the dummy coin ((−1,[ ]),0,false)((-1,[\,]),0,\mathrm{false})((−1,[]),0,false).

Witness program. For sss of length kkk: defined iff 4≤k≤424 \le k \le 424≤k≤42, s0=0s_0 = 0s0​=0 or 0x51≤s0≤0x60\mathrm{0x51} \le s_0 \le \mathrm{0x60}0x51≤s0​≤0x60, and s1+2=ks_1 + 2 = ks1​+2=k; version 000 or s0−0x50s_0 - \mathrm{0x50}s0​−0x50; program s2…sk−1s_2 \ldots s_{k-1}s2​…sk−1​. hwh_whw​ says every input of tx\mathrm{tx}tx (by membership) has a looked-up output script of this shape; since the empty script is not of this shape, every input's outpoint has an entry in uuu.

Input scripts OK for a transaction ttt with inputs [i0,…,im−1][i_0, \ldots, i_{m-1}][i0​,…,im−1​], cn=accessCoin(u,in.prevout)c_n = \mathrm{accessCoin}(u, i_n.\mathrm{prevout})cn​=accessCoin(u,in​.prevout), spent=[c0.out,…,cm−1.out]\mathrm{spent} = [c_0.\mathrm{out}, \ldots, c_{m-1}.\mathrm{out}]spent=[c0​.out,…,cm−1​.out]: for every 0≤n<m0 \le n < m0≤n<m,

verifyScript(Tspent, (f,t,n,cn.out.nValue), in.scriptSig, cn.out.scriptPubKey, in.witness)=true.\mathrm{verifyScript}\big(T_{\mathrm{spent}},\ (f, t, n, c_n.\mathrm{out}.\mathrm{nValue}),\ i_n.\mathrm{scriptSig},\ c_n.\mathrm{out}.\mathrm{scriptPubKey},\ i_n.\mathrm{witness}\big) = \mathrm{true}.verifyScript(Tspent​, (f,t,n,cn​.out.nValue), in​.scriptSig, cn​.out.scriptPubKey, in​.witness)=true.

For hhh the context carries t=txt = \mathrm{tx}t=tx and for h′h'h′ it carries t=tx′t = \mathrm{tx}'t=tx′ (the spending transaction enters signature hashing and lock-time checks through the context); spent\mathrm{spent}spent is the same list for both.

verifyScript (T,c,σ,π,w)(T, c, \sigma, \pi, w)(T,c,σ,π,w): (1) evaluate σ\sigmaσ (signature version base) on the empty stack; failure gives false; result SσS_\sigmaSσ​; (2) evaluate π\piπ on SσS_\sigmaSσ​; failure gives false; result SSS; false if SSS is empty or its top is not true (true iff some byte non-zero, except a string whose only non-zero byte is a final 0x80\mathrm{0x80}0x80); (3) if c.flags.witnessc.\mathrm{flags}.\mathrm{witness}c.flags.witness is on and isWitnessProgram(π)=(v,p)\mathrm{isWitnessProgram}(\pi) = (v,p)isWitnessProgram(π)=(v,p): false if σ≠[ ]\sigma \ne [\,]σ=[], else verifyWitnessProgram(T,c,w,v,p,false)\mathrm{verifyWitnessProgram}(T, c, w, v, p, \mathrm{false})verifyWitnessProgram(T,c,w,v,p,false), final; (4) else if c.flags.p2shc.\mathrm{flags}.\mathrm{p2sh}c.flags.p2sh is on and π=0xa9 0x14 ⟨20 bytes⟩ 0x87\pi = \mathrm{0xa9}\,\mathrm{0x14}\,\langle 20\text{ bytes}\rangle\,\mathrm{0x87}π=0xa90x14⟨20 bytes⟩0x87: σ\sigmaσ must be push-only, SσS_\sigmaSσ​ non-empty with top rrr (the redeem script), rrr evaluated on the rest must succeed with a true top; then with the witness flag on: if rrr is a witness program (v,p)(v,p)(v,p), σ\sigmaσ must equal pushBytes(r)\mathrm{pushBytes}(r)pushBytes(r) and verifyWitnessProgram(T,c,w,v,p,true)\mathrm{verifyWitnessProgram}(T,c,w,v,p,\mathrm{true})verifyWitnessProgram(T,c,w,v,p,true) decides, otherwise www must be empty; with the witness flag off, true; (5) else false if the witness flag is on and w≠[ ]w \ne [\,]w=[], else true. Script evaluation is undefined if the script exceeds 100001000010000 bytes or fails to parse, and otherwise is the Script interpreter's final stack under flags (cltv,csv,nulldummy)(\mathrm{cltv}, \mathrm{csv}, \mathrm{nulldummy})(cltv,csv,nulldummy) of ccc with the legacy oracle for (c.flags.dersig,c.tx,c.nIn,c.amount(c.\mathrm{flags}.\mathrm{dersig}, c.\mathrm{tx}, c.\mathrm{nIn}, c.\mathrm{amount}(c.flags.dersig,c.tx,c.nIn,c.amount, signature version, script code))). pushBytes(d)\mathrm{pushBytes}(d)pushBytes(d) is the canonical push (∣d∣|d|∣d∣ as one byte then ddd if ∣d∣<0x4c|d| < \mathrm{0x4c}∣d∣<0x4c; 0x4c\mathrm{0x4c}0x4c/0x4d\mathrm{0x4d}0x4d/0x4e\mathrm{0x4e}0x4e with 1/2/4 little-endian length bytes otherwise). verifyWitnessProgram(T,c,w,v,p,isP2sh)\mathrm{verifyWitnessProgram}(T,c,w,v,p,\mathrm{isP2sh})verifyWitnessProgram(T,c,w,v,p,isP2sh): v=0,∣p∣=32v=0,|p|=32v=0,∣p∣=32: last element of www must SHA-256 to ppp and is run as a witness-v0 script on the reversed remaining elements (all ≤520\le 520≤520 bytes, exactly one element left, true); v=0,∣p∣=20v=0,|p|=20v=0,∣p∣=20: ∣w∣=2|w|=2∣w∣=2 and the implied P2PKH script is run on www reversed; v=0v=0v=0 other lengths: false; v=1,∣p∣=32v=1,|p|=32v=1,∣p∣=32, not P2SH: true if c.flags.taprootc.\mathrm{flags}.\mathrm{taproot}c.flags.taproot is off, else T(c,w,p)T(c,w,p)T(c,w,p); all other cases: true. Tspent(c,w,p)T_{\mathrm{spent}}(c,w,p)Tspent​(c,w,p): false on empty www; else strip an optional annex; one element: Schnorr key-path check against ppp over c.txc.\mathrm{tx}c.tx, spent\mathrm{spent}spent, c.nInc.\mathrm{nIn}c.nIn; more: control block of length 33+32k33+32k33+32k (0≤k≤1280\le k\le 1280≤k≤128) committing ppp to the leaf script, tapscript executed for leaf version 0xc0\mathrm{0xc0}0xc0, true for other leaf versions.

Edge cases made explicit

  • If tx.vin=[ ]\mathrm{tx}.\mathrm{vin} = [\,]tx.vin=[] then by hIh_IhI​ also tx′.vin=[ ]\mathrm{tx}'.\mathrm{vin} = [\,]tx′.vin=[]; hhh, h′h'h′, hwh_whw​ hold vacuously and tx=tx′\mathrm{tx} = \mathrm{tx}'tx=tx′ outright.
  • hwh_whw​ is asserted for tx\mathrm{tx}tx only. Because hIh_IhI​ makes the outpoint sequences of tx\mathrm{tx}tx and tx′\mathrm{tx}'tx′ identical, the looked-up scripts for tx′\mathrm{tx}'tx′ are the same strings; but the statement does not itself assert SpendsWitnessPrograms(u,tx′)\mathrm{SpendsWitnessPrograms}(u, \mathrm{tx}')SpendsWitnessPrograms(u,tx′).
  • hIh_IhI​ allows tx\mathrm{tx}tx and tx′\mathrm{tx}'tx′ to differ in every scriptSig\mathrm{scriptSig}scriptSig and every witness, including having different numbers of witness elements and non-empty versus empty scriptSig\mathrm{scriptSig}scriptSigs; it forbids any difference elsewhere.
  • hhh and h′h'h′ each require every input to verify; both use the same ledger uuu and the same flags fff; the amount passed to each context is the looked-up coin's value, −1-1−1 for a missing coin.
  • Any witness version 000–161616 and program length 222–404040 satisfies hwh_whw​, including versions and lengths for which verifyWitnessProgram\mathrm{verifyWitnessProgram}verifyWitnessProgram returns true without inspecting the witness.
  • txid\mathrm{txid}txid reduces 32-bit fields modulo 2322^{32}232 and values modulo 2642^{64}264; outpoint hashes of any length are written raw.
  • The conclusion is equality of digests, not of transactions and not of witness-including identifiers; nothing is said about wtxid\mathrm{wtxid}wtxid.
  • No constraint on f.p2shf.\mathrm{p2sh}f.p2sh, f.taprootf.\mathrm{taproot}f.taproot, f.dersigf.\mathrm{dersig}f.dersig, f.cltvf.\mathrm{cltv}f.cltv, f.csvf.\mathrm{csv}f.csv, f.nulldummyf.\mathrm{nulldummy}f.nulldummy, on distinctness of ledger keys, on coinbase status, or on well-formedness is assumed.
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 29, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by pitimespi · Oct 29, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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