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Proposition 6, PDF p. 21 — the crowdfunding option lowers the expected VC investment level iff e1 ≥ R0 and Δa > 0, and otherwise raises it

Proved
CrowdfundVC.Effects.proposition6

by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

crowdfundinginvestment-levelp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1venture-capital

Compare the expected VC investment level, with respect to the unconditional belief P(θ=s)=P(θ=f)=12P(\theta = s) = P(\theta = f) = \tfrac12P(θ=s)=P(θ=f)=21​, in the two settings. Without crowdfunding the startup offers αo=R0/e1\alpha^o = R_0/e_1αo=R0​/e1​ (Proposition 1) and the level is κ(αoe1,αoe2,R0)\kappa(\alpha^o e_1, \alpha^o e_2, R_0)κ(αoe1​,αoe2​,R0​). With crowdfunding it offers αc\alpha^cαc (Proposition 4), and the level is computed along VC1_11​'s decisions: κ(v1,v2,R0)\kappa(v_1, v_2, R_0)κ(v1​,v2​,R0​) if VC1_11​ invests at t0t_0t0​, otherwise the average of the post-campaign levels after SSS and FFF with probabilities P(S∣12)P(S\mid\tfrac12)P(S∣21​), P(F∣12)P(F\mid\tfrac12)P(F∣21​).

Assume 0≤Rf<R0<Rs0 \le R_f < R_0 < R_s0≤Rf​<R0​<Rs​, 0<K<R00 < K < R_00<K<R0​, 0≤ρ≤10 \le \rho \le 10≤ρ≤1, 0≤β<10 \le \beta < 10≤β<1, 0≤p2≤p1≤10 \le p_2 \le p_1 \le 10≤p2​≤p1​≤1, 0≤pa≤10 \le p_a \le 10≤pa​≤1, ea>0e_a > 0ea​>0 and Assumption (I), e~1∣S≥R0\tilde e_1|S \ge R_0e~1​∣S≥R0​. Write IoI^oIo and IcI^cIc for the two levels. Then:

  1. if ρ>0\rho > 0ρ>0, p1<1p_1 < 1p1​<1, e1≥R0e_1 \ge R_0e1​≥R0​ and Δa>0\Delta_a > 0Δa​>0, crowdfunding reduces the level: Ic<IoI^c < I^oIc<Io;
  2. if e1≥R0e_1 \ge R_0e1​≥R0​ and Δa≤0\Delta_a \le 0Δa​≤0, crowdfunding raises the level: Io≤IcI^o \le I^cIo≤Ic;
  3. if e1<R0e_1 < R_0e1​<R0​, there is no investment without crowdfunding at any share — κ(αe1,αe2,R0)=0\kappa(\alpha e_1, \alpha e_2, R_0) = 0κ(αe1​,αe2​,R0​)=0 for every α∈[0,1]\alpha \in [0,1]α∈[0,1] — while Ic>0I^c > 0Ic>0.

In short, when ρ>0\rho > 0ρ>0 and p1<1p_1 < 1p1​<1,

Ic<Io  ⟺  e1≥R0 and Δa>0.I^c < I^o \iff e_1 \ge R_0 \text{ and } \Delta_a > 0 .Ic<Io⟺e1​≥R0​ and Δa​>0.

This is the paper's main finding on VC investment: crowdfunding lowers the expected investment exactly when a startup that VC1_11​ would fund anyway prefers to wait for the campaign, and otherwise it raises it.

Formalization Note "Raises" is weak in case 2: at β=0\beta = 0β=0 both levels equal R0R_0R0​; it is strict in case 3. The hypotheses β<1\beta < 1β<1, ea>0e_a > 0ea​>0 and 0≤Rf0 \le R_f0≤Rf​ (on the whole theorem) and ρ>0\rho > 0ρ>0, p1<1p_1 < 1p1​<1 (on case 1 only) are not in the paper and are each needed: at β=1\beta = 1β=1 VC1_11​'s threshold is not α0\alpha_0α0​; with Rf<0R_f < 0Rf​<0 the threshold can be negative; with ea=0e_a = 0ea​=0 the share αc\alpha^cαc can exceed 111; at ρ=0\rho = 0ρ=0 (or p1=1p_1 = 1p1​=1) VC1_11​ need not wait at αc\alpha^cαc and Ic=IoI^c = I^oIc=Io in case 1. The paper's case "e1<R0e_1 < R_0e1​<R0​ or Δa≤0\Delta_a \le 0Δa​≤0" is split into cases 2 and 3.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CrowdfundVC_Effects_Model
Formal statement
namespace CrowdfundVC.Effects

/-- Proposition 6 (p. 21). If `e1 ≥ R0` and `Δa > 0` (and the signal is informative, `ρ > 0`, and
`p1 < 1`), the crowdfunding option strictly reduces the expected VC investment level; if `e1 ≥ R0`
and `Δa ≤ 0`, it (weakly) raises it; if `e1 < R0`, there is no investment
without crowdfunding at any share in `[0, 1]`, and the expected level with crowdfunding is
positive. Without crowdfunding the startup offers `αᵒ = R0/e1` (Proposition 1), with crowdfunding `αᶜ`
(Proposition 4). -/
theorem proposition6 (P : Params)
    (hRf0 : 0 ≤ P.Rf) (hRfR0 : P.Rf < P.R0) (hR0Rs : P.R0 < P.Rs) (hK0 : 0 < P.K)
    (hKR0 : P.K < P.R0) (hρ0 : 0 ≤ P.ρ) (hρ1 : P.ρ ≤ 1) (hβ0 : 0 ≤ P.β) (hβ1 : P.β < 1)
    (hp2 : 0 ≤ P.p2) (hp12 : P.p2 ≤ P.p1) (hp1 : P.p1 ≤ 1) (hpa0 : 0 ≤ P.pa) (hpa1 : P.pa ≤ 1)
    (hea : 0 < ea P) (hI : P.R0 ≤ e1S P) :
    (0 < P.ρ → P.p1 < 1 →
      P.R0 ≤ e1 P → 0 < deltaA P → invLevelCF P (alphaC P) < invLevelNoCF P (P.R0 / e1 P)) ∧
    (P.R0 ≤ e1 P → deltaA P ≤ 0 → invLevelNoCF P (P.R0 / e1 P) ≤ invLevelCF P (alphaC P)) ∧
    (e1 P < P.R0 →
      (∀ α : ℝ, 0 ≤ α → α ≤ 1 → invLevelNoCF P α = 0) ∧ 0 < invLevelCF P (alphaC P)) := by sorry

end CrowdfundVC.Effects
Source
Hu, Jin & Keppo, The Crowdfunding Effects on Venture Capital Investment, SSRN author manuscript (abstract 3512638, 2024-03-15; Management Science DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2022.00994), PDF p. 21, Proposition 6; proof Online Appendix D, PDF pp. 52–53 (OA pp. 25–26)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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