Π*_PPC, p. 23 — under a PPC the marketplace's profit is max{v − c − max_{c≤p_d≤v}(p_d − c)G(v − p_d), (1 − q)(v − c)}
ProvedMarketplaceLeakage.Parity.pi_ppcLet , and , and let be the uniform switching-cost distribution on . Write
for the seller's best delisting payoff in the baseline state. Then this maximum exists, and for it the marketplace's optimal expected profit under a price-parity clause, maximizing over all fees , is
The two terms are the two candidate fees of the paper: , at which the seller accepts only in the no-switching state, and , at which it always accepts. The result reduces the marketplace's choice under a PPC to these two corners, and it is one of the two sides compared in Proposition 4.
Formalization Note. is the IsPPCValue predicate of the setting file: the stated number is the greatest expected revenue over all real fees, and it is attained. The existence of is part of the conclusion. The paper states this display for a general ; here it is posed for the uniform of Proposition 4. The hypothesis is the mission's standing assumption (the statement also holds at ).
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MarketplaceLeakage_Parity_Setting
namespace MarketplaceLeakage.Parity
theorem pi_ppc (v c μ q : ℝ) (hvc : c < v) (hμ : 0 < μ) (hq0 : 0 < q) (hq1 : q ≤ 1) :
(∃ D, IsGreatest ((fun pd => delistPayoff v c μ pd) '' Set.Icc c v) D) ∧
∀ D, IsGreatest ((fun pd => delistPayoff v c μ pd) '' Set.Icc c v) D →
IsPPCValue v c μ q (max (v - c - D) ((1 - q) * (v - c))) := by sorry
end MarketplaceLeakage.Parity
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.