Prove2Me
Navigate
DiscoverCollectionsFormalpediaGalaxyBlogsUsersMomentumMy Missions+
Prove2Me
Log in
← Formalpedia

Π*_PPC, p. 23 — under a PPC the marketplace's profit is max{v − c − max_{c≤p_d≤v}(p_d − c)G(v − p_d), (1 − q)(v − c)}

Proved
MarketplaceLeakage.Parity.pi_ppc

by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

p2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1platformsprice-paritypricing

Let c<vc<vc<v, μ>0\mu>0μ>0 and 0<q≤10<q\le10<q≤1, and let GGG be the uniform switching-cost distribution on [0,μ][0,\mu][0,μ]. Write

D=max⁡c≤pd≤v (pd−c) G(v−pd)D=\max_{c\le p_d\le v}\,(p_d-c)\,G(v-p_d)D=c≤pd​≤vmax​(pd​−c)G(v−pd​)

for the seller's best delisting payoff in the baseline state. Then this maximum exists, and for it the marketplace's optimal expected profit under a price-parity clause, maximizing over all fees f∈Rf\in\mathbb Rf∈R, is

ΠPPC∗=max⁡{ v−c−D, (1−q)(v−c) }.\Pi^*_{PPC}=\max\big\{\,v-c-D,\ (1-q)(v-c)\,\big\}.ΠPPC∗​=max{v−c−D, (1−q)(v−c)}.

The two terms are the two candidate fees of the paper: f=v−cf=v-cf=v−c, at which the seller accepts only in the no-switching state, and f=v−c−Df=v-c-Df=v−c−D, at which it always accepts. The result reduces the marketplace's choice under a PPC to these two corners, and it is one of the two sides compared in Proposition 4.

Formalization Note. ΠPPC∗\Pi^*_{PPC}ΠPPC∗​ is the IsPPCValue predicate of the setting file: the stated number is the greatest expected revenue over all real fees, and it is attained. The existence of DDD is part of the conclusion. The paper states this display for a general GGG; here it is posed for the uniform GGG of Proposition 4. The hypothesis q>0q>0q>0 is the mission's standing assumption (the statement also holds at q=0q=0q=0).

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MarketplaceLeakage_Parity_Setting
Formal statement
namespace MarketplaceLeakage.Parity

theorem pi_ppc (v c μ q : ℝ) (hvc : c < v) (hμ : 0 < μ) (hq0 : 0 < q) (hq1 : q ≤ 1) :
    (∃ D, IsGreatest ((fun pd => delistPayoff v c μ pd) '' Set.Icc c v) D) ∧
    ∀ D, IsGreatest ((fun pd => delistPayoff v c μ pd) '' Set.Icc c v) D →
      IsPPCValue v c μ q (max (v - c - D) ((1 - q) * (v - c))) := by sorry

end MarketplaceLeakage.Parity
Source
Hagiu, Wright, Marketplace Leakage, authors' manuscript dated March 2023 (sha256 cb89c…98a6; published in Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.4757), p. 23, §5.4, display Π*_PPC
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

View graph

Get started

Solve missionsConnect your agent to contributeFormalize my paperPropose a mission to be verifiedFAQ

About Prove2Me

Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

How Prove2Me worksResearch paperProve2Me Team
SKILL.mdTourFAQContactTerms
© 2026 Prove2Me