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Theorem 1, p. 11 — every pacing game admits a second price pacing equilibrium

Proved
MultPacing.Existence.theorem_1

by mikedeng1 · Oct 24, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

budgetsequilibrium-existencep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1pacingsecond-price-auction

Let NNN be a finite set of buyers and GGG a finite set of divisible goods, each sold in a second price auction. Each buyer iii has valuations vij≥0v_{ij}\ge0vij​≥0 and a budget Bi>0B_i>0Bi​>0. Then the pacing game has a second price pacing equilibrium: there are pacing multipliers α∈[0,1]N\alpha\in[0,1]^Nα∈[0,1]N, allocations xij∈[0,1]x_{ij}\in[0,1]xij​∈[0,1] and prices pjp_jpj​ such that

  1. ∑ixij≤1\sum_i x_{ij}\le1∑i​xij​≤1 for every good jjj, with equality when some vij>0v_{ij}>0vij​>0;
  2. xij>0x_{ij}>0xij​>0 implies αivij≥αkvkj\alpha_i v_{ij}\ge\alpha_k v_{kj}αi​vij​≥αk​vkj​ for every kkk;
  3. xij>0x_{ij}>0xij​>0 implies pj=max⁡k≠iαkvkjp_j=\max_{k\ne i}\alpha_k v_{kj}pj​=maxk=i​αk​vkj​ (and pj=0p_j=0pj​=0 if iii is the only buyer);
  4. ∑jpjxij≤Bi\sum_j p_j x_{ij}\le B_i∑j​pj​xij​≤Bi​ for every buyer iii;
  5. ∑jpjxij<Bi\sum_j p_j x_{ij}<B_i∑j​pj​xij​<Bi​ implies αi=1\alpha_i=1αi​=1.

In short,

every pacing game (v≥0, B>0) admits (α,x,p) with (α,x,p) an SPPE.\text{every pacing game } (v\ge0,\ B>0)\ \text{admits } (\alpha,x,p)\ \text{with } (\alpha,x,p)\ \text{an SPPE}.every pacing game (v≥0, B>0) admits (α,x,p) with (α,x,p) an SPPE.

The result holds for all finite numbers of buyers and goods and all valuations, with no genericity or tie assumption. It shows that the budget-management rule of multiplicative pacing always has a stable outcome in which every buyer best responds (Proposition 2 of the paper) and the market clears.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: buyers {1,…,n}\{1,\dots,n\}{1,…,n} and goods {1,…,m}\{1,\dots,m\}{1,…,m} → arbitrary finite types N, G; reason: the same instances up to relabelling.
  • encoding: "the per-unit price pjp_jpj​" → a price vector ppp quantified with α\alphaα and xxx and pinned to the highest other bid wherever xij>0x_{ij}>0xij​>0, with sij=pjxijs_{ij}=p_jx_{ij}sij​=pj​xij​; reason: Definition 2 names pjp_jpj​ without quantifying it, and an unpinned pjp_jpj​ only multiplies allocations equal to 000.
  • encoding: "the highest bid αi′vi′j\alpha_{i'}v_{i'j}αi′​vi′j​ other than iii's bid" → the maximum over k≠ik\ne ik=i, 000 when there is no other buyer; reason: bids are nonnegative, and the paper gives a lone bidder price 000 (p. 16).
  • encoding: budgets Bi>0B_i>0Bi​>0 → real numbers Bi>0B_i>0Bi​>0; reason: §3's model has finite budgets; Bi=∞B_i=\inftyBi​=∞ appears only in examples outside the model.
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MultPacing_Existence_Model
Formal statement
namespace MultPacing.Existence

theorem theorem_1 {N G : Type*} [Fintype N] [DecidableEq N] [Fintype G] (P : PacingGame N G) :
    ∃ (α : N → ℝ) (x : N → G → ℝ) (p : G → ℝ), IsSPPE P α x p := by sorry

end MultPacing.Existence
Source
Conitzer, Kroer, Sodomka & Stier-Moses, Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets, arXiv:1706.07151v5, p. 11 (PDF 11), Theorem 1 (with Definition 2, p. 9)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 24, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 24, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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