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Proof of Proposition 3, p. 21 — first case: g_{i,j} < 0 and x_{i,j} ≥ ε/2cn² force Σ_l φ_{i,l} < ε

Proved
FixpNash.WeakApprox.first_case_sum_lt

by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

fixed-pointnash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let Γ\GammaΓ, nnn, ccc, 0<ε≤10<\varepsilon\le10<ε≤1, ε′=ε2/(4c2n3)\varepsilon'=\varepsilon^2/(4c^2n^3)ε′=ε2/(4c2n3) and φi,j=max⁡{0,gi,j}\varphi_{i,j}=\max\{0,g_{i,j}\}φi,j​=max{0,gi,j​} be as in the coordinatewise bound, and let xxx be a weak ε′\varepsilon'ε′-approximate fixed point of Nash's function. If, for a player iii, some strategy j∈Sij\in S_ij∈Si​ has negative gain gi,j(x)<0g_{i,j}(x)<0gi,j​(x)<0 and probability

xi,j≥ε2cn2,x_{i,j}\ge\frac{\varepsilon}{2cn^2},xi,j​≥2cn2ε​,

then

∑l∈Siφi,l(x)<ε.\sum_{l\in S_i}\varphi_{i,l}(x)<\varepsilon.l∈Si​∑​φi,l​(x)<ε.

This is the first of the two cases into which the paper splits the end of the proof of Proposition 3; it bounds every positive gain of player iii by ε\varepsilonε at once.

Formalization Note "One of the strategies jjj on the rhs" means ψi,j(x)>0\psi_{i,j}(x)>0ψi,j​(x)>0, i.e. gi,j(x)<0g_{i,j}(x)<0gi,j​(x)<0, which is the hypothesis used. ϵ/2cn2\epsilon/2cn^2ϵ/2cn2 is read as ε/(2cn2)\varepsilon/(2cn^2)ε/(2cn2).

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_agt_games
import Definitions.Def_FixpNash_WeakApprox_NashFunction
import Definitions.Def_FixpNash_WeakApprox_GameConstants
Formal statement
namespace FixpNash.WeakApprox

/-- Proof of Proposition 3, p. 21, first case: if some strategy `j` with `g_{i,j}(x) < 0` has
`x_{i,j} ≥ ε/(2cn²)`, then `Σ_l φ_{i,l}(x) < ε`. -/
theorem first_case_sum_lt {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
    {S : ι → Type*} [∀ i, Fintype (S i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (S i)]
    (u : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) (ε : ℝ) (hε : 0 < ε) (hε1 : ε ≤ 1) (x : ∀ i, S i → ℝ)
    (hx : IsWeakApproxFixedPoint u x
      (ε ^ 2 / (4 * cConst u ^ 2 * (maxNumStrategies S : ℝ) ^ 3)))
    (i : ι) (j : S i) (hg : gain u x i j < 0)
    (hxj : ε / (2 * cConst u * (maxNumStrategies S : ℝ) ^ 2) ≤ x i j) :
    ∑ l : S i, max 0 (gain u x i l) < ε := by sorry

end FixpNash.WeakApprox
Source
Etessami & Yannakakis, On the complexity of Nash equilibria and other fixed points, author manuscript (SIAM J. Comput. 39 (2010)), proof of Proposition 3, second direction, first case, p. 21
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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