Proposition 2.3, proof — player 2's condition (2.2) is equivalent to (2.5)
ProvedAumann1987.TwoPerson.player2_iff_ineq_2_5correlated-equilibriumgame-theoryp2o-batch-pfp1ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let be a distribution on and player 2's payoff. Player 2's equilibrium condition (2.2) written on — for every , — holds if and only if
the second inequality of Proposition 2.3, which the proof calls (2.5).
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_Aumann1987_TwoPerson_Model open Finset
Formal statement
namespace Aumann1987.TwoPerson
/-- **Player 2 gives (2.5)** (Aumann 1987, Proposition 2.3, proof, p. 6, PDF p. 7: "Similarly, (2.5)
is seen to express the equilibrium condition (2.2) for i = 2"). For a distribution `p`, player 2's
equilibrium condition (2.2) written on `p` holds iff `∑_j (h²_{jk} − h²_{jr}) p_{jk} ≥ 0` for all
`k, r ∈ S²`.
Formalization Note: the second inequality of Proposition 2.3 carries no printed label; the proof
calls it (2.5). -/
theorem player2_iff_ineq_2_5 {S₁ S₂ : Type*} [Fintype S₁] [Fintype S₂]
(h₂ : S₁ → S₂ → ℝ) (p : S₁ → S₂ → ℝ) (hp : IsDistribution p) :
DevCond₂ h₂ p ↔ ∀ k r : S₂, 0 ≤ ∑ j, (h₂ j k - h₂ j r) * p j k := by sorry
end Aumann1987.TwoPerson
Source
Aumann, Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality, Econometrica 55 (1987), DOI 10.2307/1911154, p. 6 (PDF p. 7), Proposition 2.3, proof (player 2 gives (2.5))
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.