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p. 24, proof of Lemma 6 — a strategy whose block matches a most probable strategy of i′ earns at least M/3n − maxₛ|μ(s)|

Proved
FixpNash.Blocks.purePayoff_ge_of_matching_prob_max

by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

game-theorymatching-penniesnash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let players i,i′i,i'i,i′ of a finite game form a block matching-pennies pair (block map β\betaβ, first term μ\muμ, constant MMM, parameter nnn, so in particular i′i'i′ has at most 3n3n3n strategies), and let xxx be any mixed profile. Let j′∈Sij'\in S_ij′∈Si​ be a strategy of iii whose block corresponds to a maximum-probability strategy of i′i'i′: xi′(k)≤xi′(β(j′))x_{i'}(k)\le x_{i'}(\beta(j'))xi′​(k)≤xi′​(β(j′)) for every k∈Si′k\in S_{i'}k∈Si′​. Then

ui((i:j′);x−i) ≥ M3n−max⁡s∣μ(s)∣.u_i((i{:}j');x_{-i})\ \ge\ \frac{M}{3n}-\max_s|\mu(s)| .ui​((i:j′);x−i​) ≥ 3nM​−smax​∣μ(s)∣.

Together with the companion upper bound max⁡s∣μ(s)∣\max_s|\mu(s)|maxs​∣μ(s)∣ for strategies whose matching strategy has probability 000, and the choice M>6nmax⁡s∣μ(s)∣M>6n\max_s|\mu(s)|M>6nmaxs​∣μ(s)∣, this shows that such strategies are strictly worse than j′j'j′ for player iii.

Formalization Note. The paper writes M/3nM/3nM/3n, meaning M/(3n)M/(3n)M/(3n). max⁡s∣μ(s)∣\max_s|\mu(s)|maxs​∣μ(s)∣ is the supremum of ∣μ(s)∣|\mu(s)|∣μ(s)∣ over the finite set of pure profiles.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_agt_games
import Definitions.Def_DGPNash_NashMap_nashMap
import Definitions.Def_FixpNash_Blocks_Form
Formal statement
namespace FixpNash.Blocks

/-- Proof of Lemma 6, p. 24, second payoff bound: for any mixed profile `x`, if the block
of the strategy `j'` of `i` corresponds to a maximum-probability strategy `β j'` of `i'`,
then the expected payoff of `j'` for player `i` against the rest of `x` is at least
`M/(3n) - max_s |μ(s)|`. -/
theorem purePayoff_ge_of_matching_prob_max {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
    {S : ι → Type*} [∀ k, Fintype (S k)] [∀ k, DecidableEq (S k)]
    (u : ι → (∀ k, S k) → ℝ) (i i' : ι) (β : S i → S i')
    (μ : (∀ k, S k) → ℝ) (M : ℝ) (n : ℕ) (hG : IsBlockPair u i i' β μ M n)
    (x : ∀ k, S k → ℝ) (hx : AGT.IsMixedProfile x)
    (j' : S i) (hj' : ∀ k : S i', x i' k ≤ x i' (β j')) :
    M / (3 * (n : ℝ)) - (⨆ s : (∀ k, S k), |μ s|) ≤ DGPNash.NashMap.purePayoff u x i j' := by sorry

end FixpNash.Blocks
Source
Etessami & Yannakakis, On the complexity of Nash equilibria and other fixed points, author manuscript (SIAM J. Comput. 39 (2010)), proof of Lemma 6, part 1, p. 24
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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