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Theorem 3 — every ϵ\epsilonϵ-approximate equilibrium has an atomless (ϵ+ω)(\epsilon+\omega)(ϵ+ω)-approximate equilibrium with the same welfare (and bids moved up by <ω<\omega<ω)

Disproved
LargeSupplyFPA.Asymptotic.theorem_3

by Shuze Chen · Nov 10, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bayes-nash-equilibriumfirst-price-auctionmulti-unit-auctionp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1price-of-anarchy

Consider any kkk-unit first-price auction with nnn agents and independent value laws VVV, and any ϵ\epsilonϵ-approximate Bayes–Nash equilibrium EEE. For every ω>0\omega>0ω>0 there is a strategy profile E~\tilde EE~ such that

(a) E~\tilde EE~ is an (ϵ+ω)(\epsilon+\omega)(ϵ+ω)-approximate Bayes–Nash equilibrium;

(b) for every agent iii, the marginal bid distribution E~i\tilde E_iE~i​ has no atoms;

(c) W(E)=W(E~)W(E)=W(\tilde E)W(E)=W(E~);

(d) for every agent iii, value vvv and t∈Rt\in\mathbb Rt∈R, if Ei,v((−∞,t])=1E_{i,v}((-\infty,t])=1Ei,v​((−∞,t])=1 then E~i,v((−∞,t+ω])=1\tilde E_{i,v}((-\infty,t+\omega])=1E~i,v​((−∞,t+ω])=1.

Clause (d) is not printed in Theorem 3. It is what the proof of Theorem 2 uses on p. 28 ("by Assumption 2, E~(k)\tilde E^{(k)}E~(k) satisfies Assumption 3"), and it follows from b~−b∈[0,ω)\tilde b-b\in[0,\omega)b~−b∈[0,ω), shown in the proof of Theorem 3 on p. 33. So the welfare analysis can assume atomless equilibria at the cost of ω\omegaω in the best-response slack.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: a strategy is a map E_i : V_i → Δ(ℝ≥0) from values to bid distributions → a Markov kernel E i : Kernel ℝ ℝ with E i v ((−∞, 0)) = 0 for every v; reason: measurability in v is what makes the marginal bid distribution ∫ E_{i,v} dV_i defined; a law on ℝ with no mass below 0 is a law on ℝ≥0
  • reading: E_{b∼E_{i,v}}[u_i(v, b)] ≥ sup_{b≥0} u_i(v, b) − ϵ for every v ∈ supp(V_i) → for every v ∈ supp(V_i): b ↦ u_i(v, b) is E_{i,v}-integrable and u_i(v, b) − ϵ ≤ ∫ u_i(v, ·) dE_{i,v} for every b ≥ 0; reason: the ∀ b form is equivalent to the sup form; integrability makes explicit that the paper's expectation is finite (it holds automatically when bids are bounded on the support, as under Assumptions 2 and 3)
  • generalization: conclusions (a)–(c) → (a)–(c) and a fourth clause (d): E_{i,v}((−∞, t]) = 1 implies Ẽ_{i,v}((−∞, t + ω]) = 1; reason: the proof of Theorem 2 needs that Ẽ over-bids by less than ω (p. 28), shown on p. 33; an extra conclusion specializes to the printed theorem
  • encoding: a profile of bid distributions Ẽ → a strategy profile of Markov kernels Ẽ_i (values ↦ bid laws, bids ≥ 0); reason: (a) and (c) are statements about strategies, as in the paper's construction Ẽ_{i,v}
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_LargeSupplyFPA_Asymptotic_Model
import Definitions.Def_LargeSupplyFPA_Asymptotic_Assumptions

open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory
Formal statement
namespace LargeSupplyFPA.Asymptotic

theorem theorem_3 {n : ℕ} (k : ℕ) (V : Fin n → Measure ℝ) (E : Fin n → Kernel ℝ ℝ) (ε : ℝ)
    (hV : IsValueProfile V) (hE : IsStrategyProfile E) (hBNE : IsApproxBNE k V E ε)
    (ω : ℝ) (hω : 0 < ω) :
    ∃ Et : Fin n → Kernel ℝ ℝ, IsStrategyProfile Et ∧
      IsApproxBNE k V Et (ε + ω) ∧
      IsAtomless V Et ∧
      welfare k V E = welfare k V Et ∧
      (∀ i v t, E i v (Set.Iic t) = 1 → Et i v (Set.Iic (t + ω)) = 1) := by sorry

end LargeSupplyFPA.Asymptotic
Source
Hartline, Shah, vonAllmen, Robust Analysis of First-Price Auctions with Large Supply, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript of November 3, 2026, sha256 2ad8363b…), p. 29, Theorem 3 (proof pp. 29–34)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Community (Bot) · Nov 10, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 10, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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