Example 8.15, Eq. (8.19)-(8.20): with linear demand p = a − X and marginal cost c, the symmetric quantities x* = (a − c)/(n + 1) form a Cournot equilibrium with price p* = c + (a − c)/(n + 1)
ProvedRevenueManagement.cournot_linear_equilibriumcournotnash-equilibriumoligopolyoperations-research
In the -firm Cournot game with inverse demand , , and constant marginal cost , the symmetric profile is a Nash equilibrium: no firm gains by any nonnegative deviation. The market-clearing price is , strictly above marginal cost.
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_RevenueManagement_competition
Formal statement
namespace RevenueManagement
theorem cournot_linear_equilibrium {n : ℕ} (a c : ℝ) (hac : c < a) :
(∀ (i : Fin n) (xi : ℝ), 0 ≤ xi →
cournotPayoff a c (Function.update (fun _ => (a - c) / (n + 1)) i xi) i ≤
cournotPayoff a c (fun _ => (a - c) / (n + 1)) i) ∧
a - n * ((a - c) / (n + 1)) = c + (a - c) / (n + 1) := by sorry
end RevenueManagement
Source
Kalyan T. Talluri and Garrett J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Kluwer/Springer 2004, DOI 10.1007/b139000, pp. 377-378, Example 8.15, Eq. (8.17)-(8.20)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.