(6.2) — Γ(ψ, c, v) is a potential game iff some Q has Q(ε_S) − Q(ε_{S∖{i}}) = ψ(v_{S∪{i}})(i) − cⁱ
ProvedMondererShapley.Participation.eq_6_2game-theoryp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1potential-games
Let be a solution, and a TU game. For let be the profile in which exactly the members of choose 1. The participation game is a potential game if and only if there exists such that
This is the reformulation of the potential property on coalitions used in the proof of Theorem 6.1.
Formalization Note Since , ; the statement keeps the page's . is ι → Bool; potential game means an exact potential in the sense of (2.2) with unit weights.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MondererShapley_ClosedPath_IsPotentialGame import Definitions.Def_MondererShapley_Participation_participationPayoff import Definitions.Def_MondererShapley_Participation_profileOf
Formal statement
namespace MondererShapley.Participation
/-- (6.2): the participation game is a potential game iff there is `Q : Y → ℝ` with
`Q(ε_S) − Q(ε_{S∖{i}}) = ψ(v_{S∪{i}})(i) − cⁱ` for every `S ⊆ N` and every `i ∈ S`. -/
theorem eq_6_2 {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] (ψ : Solution ι) (c : ι → ℝ)
(v : Finset ι → ℝ) :
MondererShapley.ClosedPath.IsPotentialGame (Y := fun _ : ι => Bool) (participationPayoff ψ c v) ↔
∃ Q : (ι → Bool) → ℝ, ∀ S : Finset ι, ∀ i ∈ S,
Q (profileOf S) - Q (profileOf (S \ {i})) = ψ (S ∪ {i}) v i - c i := by sorry
end MondererShapley.Participation
Source
Monderer and Shapley, Potential Games, Games Econ. Behav. 14 (1996), p. 137 (PDF p. 14), proof of Theorem 6.1, (6.2)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.