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Proposition 1(a), p. 16 (corrected: c > 0; D = S on the boundary γ = λ(1−c)/(1+2λ)) — in Region (a) the unique symmetric equilibrium price is c + √(λ²γ² + λγ(1 − c)) − λγ, with partial coverage

Proved
CongestedPlatforms.Surge.proposition_1_a

by mikedeng1 · Oct 24, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

equilibrium-pricenash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-correctedp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1two-sided-platform

Take α=1\alpha=1α=1 (the standing assumption of §4.1), a market size λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 and a commission c∈(0,1)c\in(0,1)c∈(0,1). Suppose

γ≥(12−c)22λ  or  c≥12,andγ≥λ(1−c)1+2λ,\gamma\ge\frac{(\tfrac12-c)^2}{2\lambda}\ \text{ or }\ c\ge\tfrac12,\qquad\text{and}\qquad \gamma\ge\frac{\lambda(1-c)}{1+2\lambda},γ≥2λ(21​−c)2​  or  c≥21​,andγ≥1+2λλ(1−c)​,

which contains Region (a) of Proposition 1. Let

p∗=c+λ2γ2+λγ(1−c)−λγ.p^*=c+\sqrt{\lambda^2\gamma^2+\lambda\gamma(1-c)}-\lambda\gamma.p∗=c+λ2γ2+λγ(1−c)​−λγ.

Then:

  1. a price ppp is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the pricing game if and only if p=p∗p=p^*p=p∗;
  2. at (p∗,p∗)(p^*,p^*)(p∗,p∗) the market is partially covered: dP(p∗)+dP(p∗)≤λd^P(p^*)+d^P(p^*)\le\lambdadP(p∗)+dP(p∗)≤λ;
  3. if γ>λ(1−c)/(1+2λ)\gamma>\lambda(1-c)/(1+2\lambda)γ>λ(1−c)/(1+2λ), equilibrium demand is strictly lower than equilibrium supply, D(p∗,p∗)<S(p∗,p∗)D(p^*,p^*)<S(p^*,p^*)D(p∗,p∗)<S(p∗,p∗);
  4. if γ=λ(1−c)/(1+2λ)\gamma=\lambda(1-c)/(1+2\lambda)γ=λ(1−c)/(1+2λ), they are equal.

In this region the two platforms behave as local monopolies with spare driver capacity; together with Proposition 1(d) this pins down the equilibrium price in every supply-unconstrained market, which Proposition 3 compares across market sizes.

Formalization Note The symmetric equilibrium is taken on the action set [c,1][c,1][c,1] with the supply constraint (3.6) imposed on the deviations and on p∗p^*p∗ itself; see the Setting.

Differences from the source:

  • correction: c≥0c\ge0c≥0 → c>0c>0c>0; reason: at α=1\alpha=1α=1 the profit is cmin⁡{D,S}c\min\{D,S\}cmin{D,S}, identically 000 when c=0c=0c=0, so every price satisfying (3.6) is an equilibrium; counterexample c=0c=0c=0, λ=γ=1\lambda=\gamma=1λ=γ=1 (Region (a)), where p=1/2p=1/2p=1/2 is an equilibrium but p∗=2−1p^*=\sqrt2-1p∗=2​−1.
  • correction: "the equilibrium demand is strictly lower than equilibrium supply" → strict when γ>λ(1−c)/(1+2λ)\gamma>\lambda(1-c)/(1+2\lambda)γ>λ(1−c)/(1+2λ), equality when γ=λ(1−c)/(1+2λ)\gamma=\lambda(1-c)/(1+2\lambda)γ=λ(1−c)/(1+2λ); reason: the printed region contains this boundary, where D=SD=SD=S; counterexample c=1/5c=1/5c=1/5, λ=1\lambda=1λ=1, γ=4/15\gamma=4/15γ=4/15, where p∗−c=4/15p^*-c=4/15p∗−c=4/15 and ρ=1\rho=1ρ=1.
  • generalization: γ≥(12−c)2/(2λ)\gamma\ge(\tfrac12-c)^2/(2\lambda)γ≥(21​−c)2/(2λ) → γ≥(12−c)2/(2λ)\gamma\ge(\tfrac12-c)^2/(2\lambda)γ≥(21​−c)2/(2λ) or c≥12c\ge\tfrac12c≥21​; reason: for c≥12c\ge\tfrac12c≥21​ the market is partially covered at p∗p^*p∗ whatever γ\gammaγ is, and the printed condition is the first disjunct, so the statement specializes to the printed region.
  • reading: "the following are the symmetric equilibrium prices" → ppp is a symmetric Nash equilibrium iff p=p∗p=p^*p=p∗; reason: the formula names the equilibrium, whose existence and uniqueness Theorem 1 asserts.
  • reading: action set [p‾,pˉ][\underline p,\bar p][p​,pˉ​] and the restriction p‾<pˉ\underline p<\bar pp​<pˉ​ → [c,1][c,1][c,1] and c<1c<1c<1; reason: the natural bounds of pp. 11, 13 at α=1\alpha=1α=1.
  • reading: the supply constraint (3.6) restricts the deviations → it also holds at p∗p^*p∗; reason: "The prices selected by the platforms must also satisfy the following supply constraint" (p. 14).
  • encoding: "the platforms partially cover the market" → dP(p∗)+dP(p∗)≤λd^P(p^*)+d^P(p^*)\le\lambdadP(p∗)+dP(p∗)≤λ; reason: this is the Case P condition of Lemma 1.
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CongestedPlatforms_Surge_Setting
Formal statement
namespace CongestedPlatforms.Surge

theorem proposition_1_a (lam γ c : ℝ) (hlam : 0 < lam) (hc0 : 0 < c) (hc1 : c < 1)
    (hA1 : (1 / 2 - c) ^ 2 / (2 * lam) ≤ γ ∨ 1 / 2 ≤ c) (hA2 : lam * (1 - c) / (1 + 2 * lam) ≤ γ) :
    (∀ p : ℝ, IsSymNE lam γ 1 c p ↔
      p = c + Real.sqrt (lam ^ 2 * γ ^ 2 + lam * γ * (1 - c)) - lam * γ) ∧
    (dP lam γ 1 c (c + Real.sqrt (lam ^ 2 * γ ^ 2 + lam * γ * (1 - c)) - lam * γ) +
        dP lam γ 1 c (c + Real.sqrt (lam ^ 2 * γ ^ 2 + lam * γ * (1 - c)) - lam * γ) ≤ lam) ∧
    (lam * (1 - c) / (1 + 2 * lam) < γ →
      D lam γ 1 c (c + Real.sqrt (lam ^ 2 * γ ^ 2 + lam * γ * (1 - c)) - lam * γ)
          (c + Real.sqrt (lam ^ 2 * γ ^ 2 + lam * γ * (1 - c)) - lam * γ) <
        S lam γ 1 c (c + Real.sqrt (lam ^ 2 * γ ^ 2 + lam * γ * (1 - c)) - lam * γ)
          (c + Real.sqrt (lam ^ 2 * γ ^ 2 + lam * γ * (1 - c)) - lam * γ)) ∧
    (γ = lam * (1 - c) / (1 + 2 * lam) →
      D lam γ 1 c (c + Real.sqrt (lam ^ 2 * γ ^ 2 + lam * γ * (1 - c)) - lam * γ)
          (c + Real.sqrt (lam ^ 2 * γ ^ 2 + lam * γ * (1 - c)) - lam * γ) =
        S lam γ 1 c (c + Real.sqrt (lam ^ 2 * γ ^ 2 + lam * γ * (1 - c)) - lam * γ)
          (c + Real.sqrt (lam ^ 2 * γ ^ 2 + lam * γ * (1 - c)) - lam * γ)) := by sorry

end CongestedPlatforms.Surge
Source
Bernstein, DeCroix, Keskin, Competition between Two-Sided Platforms under Demand and Supply Congestion Effects, SSRN 3250224, version of September 16, 2019, p. 16, Proposition 1(a); proof: Online Supplement, pp. 2–3 (PDF 34–35)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 24, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 24, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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