Proposition 1(a), p. 16 (corrected: c > 0; D = S on the boundary γ = λ(1−c)/(1+2λ)) — in Region (a) the unique symmetric equilibrium price is c + √(λ²γ² + λγ(1 − c)) − λγ, with partial coverage
ProvedCongestedPlatforms.Surge.proposition_1_aequilibrium-pricenash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-correctedp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1two-sided-platform
Take (the standing assumption of §4.1), a market size and a commission . Suppose
which contains Region (a) of Proposition 1. Let
Then:
- a price is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the pricing game if and only if ;
- at the market is partially covered: ;
- if , equilibrium demand is strictly lower than equilibrium supply, ;
- if , they are equal.
In this region the two platforms behave as local monopolies with spare driver capacity; together with Proposition 1(d) this pins down the equilibrium price in every supply-unconstrained market, which Proposition 3 compares across market sizes.
Formalization Note The symmetric equilibrium is taken on the action set with the supply constraint (3.6) imposed on the deviations and on itself; see the Setting.
Differences from the source:
- correction: → ; reason: at the profit is , identically when , so every price satisfying (3.6) is an equilibrium; counterexample , (Region (a)), where is an equilibrium but .
- correction: "the equilibrium demand is strictly lower than equilibrium supply" → strict when , equality when ; reason: the printed region contains this boundary, where ; counterexample , , , where and .
- generalization: → or ; reason: for the market is partially covered at whatever is, and the printed condition is the first disjunct, so the statement specializes to the printed region.
- reading: "the following are the symmetric equilibrium prices" → is a symmetric Nash equilibrium iff ; reason: the formula names the equilibrium, whose existence and uniqueness Theorem 1 asserts.
- reading: action set and the restriction → and ; reason: the natural bounds of pp. 11, 13 at .
- reading: the supply constraint (3.6) restricts the deviations → it also holds at ; reason: "The prices selected by the platforms must also satisfy the following supply constraint" (p. 14).
- encoding: "the platforms partially cover the market" → ; reason: this is the Case P condition of Lemma 1.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CongestedPlatforms_Surge_Setting
Formal statement
namespace CongestedPlatforms.Surge
theorem proposition_1_a (lam γ c : ℝ) (hlam : 0 < lam) (hc0 : 0 < c) (hc1 : c < 1)
(hA1 : (1 / 2 - c) ^ 2 / (2 * lam) ≤ γ ∨ 1 / 2 ≤ c) (hA2 : lam * (1 - c) / (1 + 2 * lam) ≤ γ) :
(∀ p : ℝ, IsSymNE lam γ 1 c p ↔
p = c + Real.sqrt (lam ^ 2 * γ ^ 2 + lam * γ * (1 - c)) - lam * γ) ∧
(dP lam γ 1 c (c + Real.sqrt (lam ^ 2 * γ ^ 2 + lam * γ * (1 - c)) - lam * γ) +
dP lam γ 1 c (c + Real.sqrt (lam ^ 2 * γ ^ 2 + lam * γ * (1 - c)) - lam * γ) ≤ lam) ∧
(lam * (1 - c) / (1 + 2 * lam) < γ →
D lam γ 1 c (c + Real.sqrt (lam ^ 2 * γ ^ 2 + lam * γ * (1 - c)) - lam * γ)
(c + Real.sqrt (lam ^ 2 * γ ^ 2 + lam * γ * (1 - c)) - lam * γ) <
S lam γ 1 c (c + Real.sqrt (lam ^ 2 * γ ^ 2 + lam * γ * (1 - c)) - lam * γ)
(c + Real.sqrt (lam ^ 2 * γ ^ 2 + lam * γ * (1 - c)) - lam * γ)) ∧
(γ = lam * (1 - c) / (1 + 2 * lam) →
D lam γ 1 c (c + Real.sqrt (lam ^ 2 * γ ^ 2 + lam * γ * (1 - c)) - lam * γ)
(c + Real.sqrt (lam ^ 2 * γ ^ 2 + lam * γ * (1 - c)) - lam * γ) =
S lam γ 1 c (c + Real.sqrt (lam ^ 2 * γ ^ 2 + lam * γ * (1 - c)) - lam * γ)
(c + Real.sqrt (lam ^ 2 * γ ^ 2 + lam * γ * (1 - c)) - lam * γ)) := by sorry
end CongestedPlatforms.Surge
Source
Bernstein, DeCroix, Keskin, Competition between Two-Sided Platforms under Demand and Supply Congestion Effects, SSRN 3250224, version of September 16, 2019, p. 16, Proposition 1(a); proof: Online Supplement, pp. 2–3 (PDF 34–35)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.