Proposition 1, p. 10 — in any financial network, bank i's optimal risk exposure is increasing in every other bank's Z_m
ProvedRiskExposure.Complementarity.proposition_1Consider banks with interbank liabilities (bank owes bank ), all totals , deposits , a project set with for every (no systemic default), and a success probability with , decreasing and concave on (Assumption 1). Payments clear at the greatest payment equilibrium, and is bank 's best-response set.
Let be banks, , with , and equal to with replaced by . If and , then
In words: in any financial network, regular or not, risk exposures are strategic complements — bank 's optimal risk exposure is nondecreasing in every other bank's risk exposure.
Formalization Note The paper writes , which presupposes a unique, differentiable maximizer; Assumption 1 gives neither. The statement above is the strong-set-order form of " is nondecreasing in " (Topkis; Milgrom–Shannon). It implies whenever both best-response sets are singletons, and for any differentiable selection. It is vacuous when a best-response set is empty, as the paper's presupposes a maximizer. No regularity or path-connectedness of the network is assumed, and self-loops are allowed.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_RiskExposure_Complementarity_Model
namespace RiskExposure.Complementarity
theorem proposition_1 {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
(dbar : ι → ι → ℝ) (hdbar : ∀ i j, 0 ≤ dbar i j) (hdbarTot : ∀ j, 0 < dbarTot dbar j)
(v : ι → ℝ) (hv : ∀ i, 0 < v i)
(Zlo Zhi : ℝ) (hZ : Zlo ≤ Zhi) (hnd : ∀ i, v i + dbarTot dbar i ≤ Zlo)
(P : ℝ → ℝ) (hP01 : ∀ z ∈ Set.Icc Zlo Zhi, 0 < P z ∧ P z < 1)
(hPanti : AntitoneOn P (Set.Icc Zlo Zhi))
(hPconc : ConcaveOn ℝ (Set.Icc Zlo Zhi) (fun z => P z * z))
(i m : ι) (hmi : m ≠ i) (Z : ι → ℝ) (hZbox : ∀ j, Z j ∈ Set.Icc Zlo Zhi)
(zm' : ℝ) (hzm' : zm' ∈ Set.Icc Zlo Zhi) (hle : Z m ≤ zm')
(zh zh' : ℝ) (hzh : zh ∈ bestResponse dbar v P Zlo Zhi Z i)
(hzh' : zh' ∈ bestResponse dbar v P Zlo Zhi (Function.update Z m zm') i) :
max zh zh' ∈ bestResponse dbar v P Zlo Zhi (Function.update Z m zm') i ∧
min zh zh' ∈ bestResponse dbar v P Zlo Zhi Z i := by sorry
end RiskExposure.Complementarity
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.