Proof of Proposition 2, OA p. 4 — (B.5) ⇔ [1 + η(1/θ_H + 1/θ_L − 1)]w ≤ Σ µ(m|L)a_m
ProvedYieldCheapTalk.Truthful.ic_low_iffcheap-talkincentive-compatibilityp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1truth-revealing-equilibrium
Assume the standing assumptions of the model. Then the low type's incentive condition
holds if and only if
the right inequality of (6).
Together with the high-type counterpart, this identifies the IC condition (5) with condition (6) of Proposition 2.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_YieldCheapTalk_Truthful_Setting open MeasureTheory
Formal statement
namespace YieldCheapTalk.Truthful
theorem ic_low_iff (M : Model) (hM : M.Standing) :
(M.Qr (M.theta .L) (M.a .H) - M.Qr (M.theta .H) (M.a .H)) * M.mu .H .L ≥
(M.Qr (M.theta .H) (M.a .L) - M.Qr (M.theta .L) (M.a .L)) * M.mu .L .L ↔
(1 + M.eta * (1 / M.theta .H + 1 / M.theta .L - 1)) * M.w ≤
∑ m, M.mu m .L * M.a m := by sorry
end YieldCheapTalk.Truthful
Source
Lu, Can a Supplier’s Yield Risk Be Truthfully Communicated via Cheap Talk?, author manuscript of 14 July 2024 (MSOM, doi:10.1287/msom.2023.0089), OA p. 4 (PDF 31), Online Appendix B, proof of Proposition 2, (B.5)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.