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Proposition 1 — the acquirer hires iff v_a > v_s, then only through acquihiring; the employee prefers direct hiring

Proved
AcquihiringMonopsony.Baseline.proposition_1

by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

acquihiringacquisitionmonopsonyp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1wage-competition

Consider the baseline model: a startup and an acquirer value an essential employee at vsv_svs​ and vav_ava​, the employee enjoys a private benefit bbb at the startup, wages are at least w‾\underline{w}w​, and

b>0,min⁡{va,vs}>b+w‾.b > 0, \qquad \min\{v_a, v_s\} > b + \underline{w}.b>0,min{va​,vs​}>b+w​.

The acquirer first chooses between direct hiring (simultaneous wage competition with the startup) and acquihiring (a take-it-or-leave-it bid for the startup, followed by a wage offer from whichever firm then employs the worker). Fix any continuation equilibrium in undominated strategies of each subgame.

  1. If va>vsv_a > v_sva​>vs​, the acquirer hires the employee, and does so through acquihiring: its bid is accepted, and its acquihiring payoff is strictly larger than its direct-hiring payoff.
  2. If va<vsv_a < v_sva​<vs​, the acquirer does not hire the employee under either mode.
  3. For all parameter values, the employee's payoff is strictly larger under direct hiring than under acquihiring.
  4. Continuation equilibria of the direct-hiring subgame exist whenever va≠vs+bv_a \ne v_s + bva​=vs​+b, and of the acquihiring subgame whenever va≠vsv_a \ne v_sva​=vs​.

In words: if the acquirer hires the employee, which happens when va>vsv_a > v_sva​>vs​, it does so through acquihiring; however, the employee always prefers direct hiring. Acquihiring lets the acquirer act as a monopsonist and pay only the wage floor, at the price of compensating the startup for its retention profit but not the employee for her private benefit.

Formalization Note. The acquirer's choice of mode is expressed by comparing its continuation payoffs, quantified over all continuation equilibria of both subgames; the payoffs are not taken as definitions but derived from the equilibrium predicates. At the knife edge va=vsv_a = v_sva​=vs​ the page says nothing about hiring and clauses 1–2 are silent; clause 3 holds there too. Clause 4 is added so that clauses 1–3 are not vacuously true; it reflects the page's "which happens when va>vsv_a > v_sva​>vs​".

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_AcquihiringMonopsony_Baseline_Model
Formal statement
namespace AcquihiringMonopsony.Baseline

/-- Proposition 1 (p. 6). Fix any continuation equilibrium `σD` of the direct-hiring subgame and
any continuation equilibrium `σA` of the acquihiring subgame.
1. If `v_a > v_s`, the acquirer hires the employee through acquihiring: the bid is accepted, and
   acquihiring gives the acquirer a strictly larger payoff than direct hiring.
2. If `v_a < v_s`, the acquirer does not hire the employee by either mode.
3. The employee strictly prefers the direct-hiring outcome to the acquihiring outcome.
4. Continuation equilibria of both subgames exist (away from the knife edges
   `v_a = v_s + b` and `v_a = v_s` respectively), so 1–3 are not vacuous. -/
theorem proposition_1 (P : Params) (hP : P.Standing)
    (σD : DHProfile) (hD : IsDHEquilibrium P σD) (σA : AHProfile) (hA : IsAHEquilibrium P σA) :
    (P.vs < P.va → σA.acceptBid σA.p = true ∧
      dhPayoffA P σD.acceptA σD.wa σD.ws < ahPayoffA P σA σA.p) ∧
    (P.va < P.vs → σA.acceptBid σA.p = false ∧ σD.acceptA σD.wa σD.ws = false) ∧
    ahPayoffE P σA < dhPayoffE P σD.acceptA σD.wa σD.ws ∧
    ((P.va ≠ P.vs + P.b → ∃ σ : DHProfile, IsDHEquilibrium P σ) ∧
      (P.va ≠ P.vs → ∃ σ : AHProfile, IsAHEquilibrium P σ)) := by sorry

end AcquihiringMonopsony.Baseline
Source
Bar-Isaac, Johnson, Nocke, Acquihiring for Monopsony Power, CRC TR 224 DP No. 500 (Jan. 2024), p. 6 (PDF 7), Proposition 1
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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