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Proof of Theorem 2 — every f-set game has a correlated equilibrium

Proved
HartSchmeidler.FinStrat.fset_game_has_ce

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

correlated-equilibriumfinite-gamesp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let NNN be a nonempty set of players, each with a nonempty finite strategy set SiS^iSi, and let each real payoff hih^ihi be bounded on the full profile space SSS. For every f-set T=∏iTiT=\prod_iT^iT=∏i​Ti, the restricted game ΓT\Gamma_TΓT​ has a finite weighted correlated equilibrium: there are finitely many profiles F⊆TF\subseteq TF⊆T and nonnegative weights wsw_sws​ summing to one such that

∑s∈Fsi=riws[hi(s)−hi(s−i,ti)]≥0(i∈N, ri,ti∈Ti).\sum_{\substack{s\in F\\s^i=r^i}}w_s\bigl[h^i(s)-h^i(s^{-i},t^i)\bigr]\ge0\qquad(i\in N,\ r^i,t^i\in T^i).s∈Fsi=ri​∑​ws​[hi(s)−hi(s−i,ti)]≥0(i∈N, ri,ti∈Ti).

This supplies the approximating equilibria qTq_TqT​ in the proof of Theorem 2. No continuity is required for this finite-game step.

Formalization Note. An f-set has nonempty TiT^iTi and only finitely many nonsingleton coordinates. The boundedness hypothesis records §3's standing game convention; finite restrictions themselves require no continuity. Profiles in FFF are supported on TTT, and zero-weight profiles may be included in FFF without changing the represented distribution.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_HartSchmeidler_FinStrat_Game
Formal statement
namespace HartSchmeidler.FinStrat

open MeasureTheory

/-- Proof of Theorem 2, pp. 22–23: every f-set game Γ_T has a finite-support
correlated equilibrium, whether or not the payoff functions are continuous. -/
theorem fset_game_has_ce {ι : Type*} [Nonempty ι] [DecidableEq ι]
    {S : ι → Type*} [∀ i, Fintype (S i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (S i)]
    [∀ i, Nonempty (S i)]
    (h : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ)
    (hbounded : ∀ i, ∃ C : ℝ, ∀ s, |h i s| ≤ C)
    (T : ∀ i, Finset (S i))
    (hT : IsFSet T) :
    ∃ (F : Finset (∀ i, S i)) (w : (∀ i, S i) → ℝ), IsFSetCE h T F w := by sorry

end HartSchmeidler.FinStrat
Source
Hart and Schmeidler, Existence of Correlated Equilibria, Math. Oper. Res. 14 (1989), p. 22, proof of Theorem 2 (f-set game and q_T)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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