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Corollary 1, p. 14 — the equilibrium ransom r∗r^*r∗ is not monotonically decreasing in the mechanism efficiency γδ\gamma\deltaγδ

Proved
ReviewBlackmail.Central.corollary_1

by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

comparative-staticsequilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1review-blackmail

Under the standing assumptions of the centralized review-blackmail model, suppose the hassle cost is positive, c>0c>0c>0, and

p < π(a)−π(aNn)−c,p\ <\ \pi(a)-\pi(a^n_N)-c,p < π(a)−π(aNn​)−c,

which is the corollary's hypothesis p<(1−γδ)[π(a)−π(aNn)]p<(1-\gamma\delta)[\pi(a)-\pi(a^n_N)]p<(1−γδ)[π(a)−π(aNn​)] read at the efficiency γδ=c/(π(a)−π(aNn))\gamma\delta=c/(\pi(a)-\pi(a^n_N))γδ=c/(π(a)−π(aNn​)) where the two regimes of Proposition 2 meet. Then the equilibrium ransom is not monotonically decreasing in the mechanism efficiency e=γδe=\gamma\deltae=γδ: there are efficiencies

0≤e1<e2≤10\le e_1<e_2\le 10≤e1​<e2​≤1

such that the malicious consumer purchases at both, p<(1−ek)[π(a)−π(aNn)]p<(1-e_k)[\pi(a)-\pi(a^n_N)]p<(1−ek​)[π(a)−π(aNn​)] for k=1,2k=1,2k=1,2, the equilibrium ransoms r∗(e1)r^*(e_1)r∗(e1​) and r∗(e2)r^*(e_2)r∗(e2​) (the greatest ransoms at which settling prevails) exist, and

r∗(e1)<r∗(e2).r^*(e_1)<r^*(e_2).r∗(e1​)<r∗(e2​).

So making the platform's mechanism more efficient can increase the ransom a blackmailer extracts: r∗r^*r∗ jumps upward where the regime of Proposition 2(1) gives way to that of Proposition 2(2).

Formalization Note "Not monotonically decreasing" is read as "not nonincreasing", i.e. the existence of e1<e2e_1<e_2e1​<e2​ with r∗(e1)<r∗(e2)r^*(e_1)<r^*(e_2)r∗(e1​)<r∗(e2​); the reading "not strictly decreasing" would hold trivially if r∗r^*r∗ were constant. The efficiency e=γδe=\gamma\deltae=γδ is quantified directly over [0,1][0,1][0,1] (every e∈[0,1]e\in[0,1]e∈[0,1] is γδ\gamma\deltaγδ with γ=e\gamma=eγ=e, δ=1\delta=1δ=1). The posterior aNna^n_NaNn​ does not depend on the efficiency and is written M.post 1 .N (visibility probability 111 of a malicious review). The hypothesis c>0c>0c>0 is a disclosed addition: the model allows c≥0c\ge 0c≥0, but at c=0c=0c=0 the corollary is false, since then r∗(e)=(1−e)[π(a)−π(aNc)]r^*(e)=(1-e)[\pi(a)-\pi(a^c_N)]r∗(e)=(1−e)[π(a)−π(aNc​)] is nonincreasing in eee.


Retired 2026-10-27: a Lean-vs-paper fidelity audit found this statement weaker than, or narrower than, the cited result. A corrected statement will be resubmitted.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_ReviewBlackmail_Central_Setting
Formal statement
namespace ReviewBlackmail.Central

theorem corollary_1 (M : Model) (hM : M.Standing) (hc : 0 < M.c)
    (hp : M.p < M.π M.a - M.π (M.post 1 .N) - M.c) :
    ∃ e₁ e₂ r₁ r₂ : ℝ, 0 ≤ e₁ ∧ e₁ < e₂ ∧ e₂ ≤ 1 ∧
      M.p < (1 - e₁) * (M.π M.a - M.π (M.post 1 .N)) ∧
      M.p < (1 - e₂) * (M.π M.a - M.π (M.post 1 .N)) ∧
      IsGreatest {r : ℝ | M.SettlePrevails e₁ r} r₁ ∧
      IsGreatest {r : ℝ | M.SettlePrevails e₂ r} r₂ ∧
      r₁ < r₂ := by sorry

end ReviewBlackmail.Central
Source
Papanastasiou, Yang, Zhang, Improving Dispute Resolution in Two-Sided Platforms: The Case of Review Blackmail, accepted manuscript (LBS Research Online eprint 1988; Management Science 69(10), 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4655), p. 14, Corollary 1 (proof pp. 39–40)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 15, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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