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(18), p. 45 — for symmetric IC µ, b(y, z) ≤ b(y + z − a, a) = b̂(y, z) on [a, ∞)²

Proved
MultiItemRev.BundlingOpt.display_18

by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bundlingconvexitymechanism-designp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let μ=(q,s)\mu = (q,s)μ=(q,s) be an incentive-compatible symmetric two-good mechanism with buyer payoff bbb, and let a≥0a \ge 0a≥0. Then for every (y,z)(y, z)(y,z) with y,z≥ay, z \ge ay,z≥a,

b(y,z) ≤ b(y+z−a, a)=b^(y,z).b(y, z) \ \le\ b(y + z - a,\ a) = \hat b(y,z).b(y,z) ≤ b(y+z−a, a)=b^(y,z).

The point (y,z)(y,z)(y,z) lies on the segment between (y+z−a,a)(y+z-a, a)(y+z−a,a) and (a,y+z−a)(a, y+z-a)(a,y+z−a), at which bbb takes the same value by symmetry. This inequality says that the bundled payoff b^\hat bb^ majorizes bbb on the quadrant [a,∞)2[a,\infty)^2[a,∞)2, which is the key comparison in the proof of Theorem 16.

Formalization Note Only incentive compatibility (which gives convexity of bbb) and symmetry are assumed. Valuations are in R≥0\mathbb{R}_{\ge0}R≥0​, and y+z−a≥ay + z - a \ge ay+z−a≥a under the hypotheses, so the subtraction is exact.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MultiItemRev_BundlingOpt_Model
import Definitions.Def_MultiItemRev_BundlingOpt_Bundling
open MeasureTheory
open scoped NNReal ENNReal
Formal statement
namespace MultiItemRev.BundlingOpt

theorem display_18 (M : Mechanism (Fin 2)) (hIC : IsIC M) (hsym : IsSymmetric M)
    (a y z : ℝ≥0) (hy : a ≤ y) (hz : a ≤ z) :
    buyerPayoff M ![y, z] ≤ buyerPayoff M ![y + z - a, a] := by sorry

end MultiItemRev.BundlingOpt
Source
Hart and Nisan, Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items, arXiv:1204.1846v3, p. 45, proof of Theorem 16, display (18)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 9, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 9, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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