Theorem 2.8, proof (2) ⇒ (1): vanishing closed-path sums give a potential
ProvedMondererShapley.ClosedPath.isPotentialGame_of_closed_pathsgame-theoryp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1potential-games
Let be a strategic-form game with payoff vector . If every finite closed path satisfies , then admits an exact potential :
This is the converse to the telescoping implication in Theorem 2.8 and turns path independence into a game-wide function.
Formalization Note The empty profile space is permitted; in that case a potential exists as a function on the empty type. Players are finite, but their strategy sets need not be finite.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MondererShapley_ClosedPath_IsPotentialGame import Definitions.Def_MondererShapley_ClosedPath_FinPath
Formal statement
namespace MondererShapley.ClosedPath
variable {ι : Type*} [DecidableEq ι] {Y : ι → Type*}
/-- Theorem 2.8, proof of (2) implies (1), p. 138. -/
theorem isPotentialGame_of_closed_paths [Fintype ι]
(u : ι → (∀ i, Y i) → ℝ)
(hclosed : ∀ γ : FinPath Y, γ.IsClosed → γ.I u = 0) :
IsPotentialGame u := by sorry
end MondererShapley.ClosedPath
Source
Monderer and Shapley, Potential Games, Games Econ. Behav. 14 (1996), p. 138 (PDF p. 15), Theorem 2.8, proof (2) ⇒ (1); https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0044
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.