§3.2, p. 10 — binding participation gives reduced payoff (6)
ProvedOpRiskInspection.RandomVsPeriodic.reduction_6inspectionp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1payoffprincipal-agent
Fix the paper's standing parameters, an inspection cost , a frequency , an inspection-interval law , a penalty , a wage , and an optimal effort path . If the agent's participation constraint binds, , then the principal's payoff (3) equals the reduced payoff (6):
This equality removes the wage from the principal's objective at a binding feasible strategy and is the algebraic reduction used in the policy comparisons.
Formalization Note The statement gives the equality under binding participation. The preceding prose's claim that every optimum binds is a separate optimization claim, not assumed here.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_OpRiskInspection_RandomVsPeriodic_Setting
Formal statement
namespace OpRiskInspection.RandomVsPeriodic
/-- Equation (6), p. 10, under the binding participation constraint (5). -/
theorem reduction_6 (p : Params) (hp : Standing p) (K v P w : ℝ)
(F : MeasureTheory.Measure ℝ) (a : Effort)
(hv : 0 < v) (hK : 0 < K) (ha : AgentOptimal p F P a)
(hbind : agentPayoff p F a P w = p.pibar) :
principalPayoff p K v F a P w = reducedPayoff p K v F a := by sorry
end OpRiskInspection.RandomVsPeriodic
Source
Kim & Xu, Operational Risk Management: Optimal Inspection Policy, SSRN 3491006 (version of July 2023), p. 10, §3.2 and (6)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.