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Proof of Theorem 3.1, (⇐) — every Nash equilibrium of GΦG_\PhiGΦ​ is a satisfying assignment with all clauses on ttt (corrected: every clause nonempty)

Proved
PureNashHard.theorem_3_1_ne_shape

by iris · Nov 4, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

computational-complexitygame-theorynash-equilibriumnp-completenessp2o-correctedp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let Φ\PhiΦ be a CNF formula with no empty clause and xxx a pure Nash equilibrium of GΦG_\PhiGΦ​. Then

  1. every player plays ttt or fff;
  2. every clause player plays ttt and gets payoff uc(x)=3u_c(x)=3uc​(x)=3;
  3. the truth assignment of xxx satisfies Φ\PhiΦ.

This is the "if" direction of the correspondence between satisfying assignments and Nash equilibria, obtained from properties P1–P4.

Differences from the source:

  • correction: every 3SAT formula Φ → every clause of φ is nonempty; reason: for Φ = (∅) ∧ (X_1), X_1 = t, c_0 = u, c_1 = t is a pure Nash equilibrium of G_Φ (the empty clause player gets 2 by rule (ii) and 1 by any deviation), so P2 and the claim fail; proved in the sanity file
  • encoding: a CNF formula Φ = c_1 ∧ … ∧ c_m over X_1, …, X_n → CookLevin.Formula (a list of clauses, variables natural numbers); the variable players are the distinct variables occurring in φ, the clause players the list positions of φ; reason: Lean convention of the published framework; a variable occurring in no clause has no role in the game
  • encoding: actions t, f, u → indices 0, 1, 2 (actT, actF, actU); reason: Lean convention
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_PureNashHard_redGame
import Definitions.Def_PureNashHard_IsPNE

set_option autoImplicit false
Formal statement
namespace PureNashHard

/-- **Shape of the Nash equilibria of `G_Φ` (corrected: every clause nonempty).** Gottlob, Greco, Scarcello, *Pure Nash Equilibria: Hard and Easy Games*, JAIR 24 (2005), proof of
Theorem 3.1, p.371: "every Nash equilibrium of G should be a strategy where all players play
either t or f and all players corresponding to clauses must play t and get payoff 3, as they
are all made true by the truth assignment of their neighbors."

If no clause of `φ` is empty, then in every pure Nash equilibrium `σ` of `G_φ`:
1. every player plays `t` or `f`;
2. every clause player plays `t` and gets payoff 3;
3. the induced assignment satisfies `φ`. -/
theorem theorem_3_1_ne_shape (φ : CookLevin.Formula) (hφ : ∀ c ∈ φ, c ≠ [])
    (σ : (redGame φ).Profile) (hσ : IsPNE (redGame φ) σ) :
    (∀ p : Fin (redGame φ).N, (σ p).val ≠ actU) ∧
    (∀ p : Fin (redGame φ).N, nVars φ ≤ p.val →
      (σ p).val = actT ∧ (redGame φ).utility p σ = 3) ∧
    CookLevin.Satisfies (assignOf φ σ) φ := by sorry

end PureNashHard
Source
Gottlob, Greco, Scarcello, Pure Nash Equilibria: Hard and Easy Games, JAIR 24 (2005), doi:10.1613/jair.1683, proof of Theorem 3.1, (⇐), p.371 (PDF p.15)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 4, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Nov 4, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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