Proposition 5, p. 22 — θ̂12 ∈ (0,1): below it supplier 1 sells only directly at some c > 0; above it, through both channels at some c < 0
ProvedNonExclEncroach.Channels.proposition_5There is a threshold , the root of , such that:
- for every we have , and for every direct cost the game has an equilibrium and in every equilibrium supplier 1 sells only through her direct channel (), even though her direct channel is less efficient than the reselling channel;
- for every we have ; and for every and every direct cost there is an equilibrium in which supplier 1 sells through both channels ( and ), even though her direct channel is more efficient than the reselling channel.
In symbols, with the set of equilibria,
With an exclusive reseller () neither happens: the encroaching supplier always uses the reseller when and never when . Non-exclusivity reverses both conclusions, depending on how substitutable the two suppliers' products are.
Formalization Note The threshold is pinned as the root of , as in the paper's proof. The paper's "there exist positive (negative) values of " is strengthened to every (every ), which is what Lemma 4 gives; part (a) also asserts that every equilibrium has , as the paper's proof of Lemma 4 claims uniqueness for . Part (b) asserts existence only, as in the paper, and is stated for : a numerical solution of the game finds that for the prices of Table 1 are not an equilibrium at some negative (for at every tested ), because the reseller then prefers an order outside the region the paper's Lemmas 1–3 restrict to; whether some other equilibrium with exists there is open. The standing range holds automatically for the costs in both parts.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_NonExclEncroach_Channels_Model
namespace NonExclEncroach.Channels
theorem proposition_5 :
∃ θhat : ℝ, 0 < θhat ∧ θhat < 1 ∧ num1 θhat = 0 ∧
(∀ θ, 0 < θ → θ < θhat →
0 < c2 θ ∧
∀ c, 0 < c → c ≤ c2 θ →
(∃ σ, IsEquilibrium θ c σ) ∧
∀ σ, IsEquilibrium θ c σ → σ.q1 = 0 ∧ 0 < σ.y) ∧
(∀ θ, θhat < θ → θ < 1 → c2 θ < 0) ∧
(∀ θ, θhat < θ → θ ≤ 9 / 10 →
∀ c, c2 θ < c → c < 0 →
∃ σ, IsEquilibrium θ c σ ∧ 0 < σ.q1 ∧ 0 < σ.y) := by sorry
end NonExclEncroach.Channels
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.