Indifferent consumer and Hotelling demand
ProvedDrugMarket.indifferent_consumereconomicsgame-theoryindustrial-organization
With outlets at the endpoints (, ) and , a consumer located at is indifferent between the two outlets exactly when . The violence disutility is common to both outlets and cancels, so the location choice reacts to prices only, not to violence.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_drug_market_model import Definitions.Def_drug_market_equilibrium
Formal statement
namespace DrugMarket theorem indifferent_consumer (u z t p_a p_b v_a v_b v_r x : ℝ) (ht : 0 < t) (hx : x ∈ Set.Icc (0:ℝ) 1) : utilA u z t p_a v_a v_b v_r x = utilB u z t p_b v_a v_b v_r x ↔ x = (1:ℝ)/2 + (p_b - p_a)/(2*t) := by sorry end DrugMarket
Source
Gilberto José Nogueira Júnior, *Mercado de Drogas e Repressão: Efeitos da Intervenção Governamental sobre a Violência gerada pelo Mercado de Drogas numa Rede Verticalmente Relacionada*, MSc dissertation, UFPE/PIMES, 2019, Chapter 3. Eq. (3.5)–(3.7).
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.