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Main Theorem — Bayes rationality at every state yields a correlated equilibrium distribution

Proved
Aumann1987.BayesRational.main_theorem

by mikedeng1 · Oct 4, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bayesian-rationalitycorrelated-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp1ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let (Ω,p,(Pi),s)(\Omega,p,(\mathcal P^i),\mathbf s)(Ω,p,(Pi),s) be an information system for a game with payoffs hhh: a finite set of states Ω\OmegaΩ, a common prior ppp, information partitions Pi\mathcal P^iPi, and action functions si\mathbf s^isi measurable with respect to Pi\mathcal P^iPi. If each player is Bayes rational at each state of the world, then the distribution of the action nnn-tuple,

Q(a)=p{ω∈Ω: s(ω)=a},a∈S,Q(a)=p\{\omega\in\Omega:\ \mathbf s(\omega)=a\},\qquad a\in S,Q(a)=p{ω∈Ω: s(ω)=a},a∈S,

is a correlated equilibrium distribution.

This is Aumann's Main Theorem: common knowledge of Bayesian rationality, under a common prior, leads to correlated equilibrium play.

Formalization Note. The set of states lives in Type (universe 0), matching the definition of a correlated equilibrium distribution.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_agt_games
import Definitions.Def_Aumann1987_BayesRational_CorrelatedEquilibrium
import Definitions.Def_Aumann1987_BayesRational_InformationSystem
Formal statement
namespace Aumann1987.BayesRational

/-- **Main Theorem** (Aumann 1987, Econometrica 55, Sect. 3, p. 7, PDF p. 8): "If each player is
Bayes rational at each state of the world, then the distribution of the action `n`-tuple `s` is a
correlated equilibrium distribution."

For every information system `I` (finite `Ω`, common prior `p`, partitions `𝒫ⁱ`, each `sⁱ`
measurable w.r.t. `𝒫ⁱ`) in which every player is Bayes rational at every state, the distribution
`a ↦ p{ω : s(ω) = a}` of `s` is a correlated equilibrium distribution of the game.

**Formalization Note.** `Ω` lives in `Type` (universe 0), matching `IsCED`, whose witnessing
probability space ranges over `Type`; every finite set is in bijection with some `Fin n`, so
nothing is lost. -/
theorem main_theorem {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] {S : ι → Type*}
    {Ω : Type} [Fintype Ω] (h : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) (I : InformationSystem Ω S)
    (hrat : ∀ i ω, IsBayesRationalAt h I.p I.P I.s i ω) :
    IsCED h (distr I.p I.s) := by sorry

end Aumann1987.BayesRational
Source
Aumann, Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality, Econometrica 55 (1987), DOI 10.2307/1911154, p. 7 (PDF p. 8), Main Theorem
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 4, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 4, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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